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Responsible Republicanism: Educating
for Citizenship
Suzanna Sherryt
"Liberty means responsibility. That is why most men
dread it."'
"The extent to which we take the commitment to democra-
cy seriously is measured by the extent to which we take
the commitment to education seriously. In these days,
saying these words fills me with shame for the state of
democracy at the end of the twentieth century."2
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized what
none of us can doubt: education is vital to citizenship in a demo-
cratic republic. Moreover, because the Court has left open the
question whether there might be a constitutional right to a mini-
mally adequate education,3 scholarly commentary has speculated
for at least the last decade on possible constitutional bases for
such a right. No one, however, has much explored the possible
content of a right to education. In particular, there has been little
examination of the concrete relationship between education and
citizenship. What are the appropriate contours of an education
for citizenship?
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Of course, asking such a question raises even more difficult
questions about citizenship itself. There is no dearth of literature
on the rights of citizens, but it seems disingenuous (and maybe
circular) to argue that one needs an education to exercise the
rights of citizenship. After all, despite some claims that illiteracy
is inevitably disenfranchising, one can vote-as well as earn a
living, own property, raise a family, and do whatever else might
be suggested as a right of citizenship-without an education.
Millions do. The core of the claim that education is necessary to
citizenship must instead be that education is necessary to the
thoughtful or responsible exercise of citizenship rights.
But focusing on how a right is exercised changes the nature
of the argument. Citizens are no longer simply rights-bearing
individuals. They are, rather, rights-bearing individuals with
responsibilities. If what is important is not that one has a right
to vote but that one is able to (and does) use it wisely, we have
moved our vision of citizenship from rights alone to rights and
duties, or rights and responsibilities. We have, in a word, added
virtue to the mix.
Once we introduce virtue into our concept of citizenship, we
can draw on another vast body of literature: that of the neo-re-
publican revival. But if the literature on rights suffers from an
inattention to virtue, the most telling weakness of the neo-repub-
lican revival is its neglect of rights. Scholars in both camps have
begun to recognize the complementary nature of their theories,
and there is now a growing group of legal academics trying to
reconcile rights and republicanism.
Such attempts at reconciliation cannot succeed without
greater attention to an element of historical republicanism that
tends to be neglected by the revivalists: individual responsibility.
Our preoccupation with rights, even when diluted by a neo-re-
publican focus on deliberation and community, leaves us bereft of
any substantive notion of the responsibilities of citizenship. And
it is the responsibilities of citizenship that implicate education
and provide a bridge between selfish, rights-bearing individuals
and their deliberative republican community. To put it another
way, one can reconcile rights and republicanism only by suggest-
ing that a republican citizen needs an education that will enable
her to exercise both the rights and the responsibilities of citizen-
ship.
What I will here call an education for republican citizenship,
however, is very different from the right to an education for its
own sake or for the benefit of the individual. Moreover, the idea
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of responsibility changes the nature of the education itself: an
education is no longer something merely provided by the govern-
ment and consumed by the individual. It is, rather, an ongoing
lesson in responsible citizenship that requires participation and
dedication on the part of present and future citizens.
In this Article, I hope to weave all these strands together
into a concrete examination of the substantive legal implications
of an education for republican citizenship. In Part I, I will survey
the current state of the literature on rights and republicanism
and elaborate the concept of responsibility. In Part II, I will
sketch the substantive outlines of an education for republican
citizenship based on the ideas explored in Part I. Finally, in Part
HI, I will turn to Supreme Court cases on constitutional ques-
tions arising in the context of elementary and secondary schools,
analyzing them in light of the proposed education for republican
citizenship.
I. RESPONSIBLE REPUBLICANISM
A. A Republic of Rights?
After almost two hundred years, Thomas Jefferson has ap-
parently been proven right: We are all republicans now.4 If you
have not yet encountered the newly recycled concepts of republi-
canism and civic virtue, you have not been reading the law re-
views-nor the journals of history or philosophy.' From relative-
ly modest beginnings among a handful of philosophers, the con-
cept of civic republicanism as a powerful explanatory paradigm
spread unchecked through historians of both eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century America, and then came to the attention of
" Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar 4, 1801), in Paul L. Ford, ed, 9
The Works of Thomas Jefferson 193, 195 (Putnam's Sons, 1905).
6 For those who have not been reading the law reviews (or whose eyes have glazed
over at the thought of yet another article on civic republicanism), a brief introduction
might be in order. At least as portrayed by legal academics, civic republicanism is a
political philosophy-with an arguable early-American pedigree-that deemphasizes
individual rights in favor of deliberative participation by citizens in their civic communi-
ties. Republicans tend, therefore, to focus on citizenship, community, and civic virtue
rather than pluralism and individual rights. I will suggest in this Article that true civic
republicanism also demands an attention to individual responsibility, which has not been
prominent in the modem civic republican literature.
The uninitiated might also appreciate a word on terminology. "republican" refers to
civic republicans, not to the GOP, and, unless modified by "political" or some similar
adjective, "liberal" is used as the antithesis of "civic republican" rather than in its more
modem meaning of progressive. "Liberal" thus denotes a political philosophy of individu-
alism in which community plays at best a minor role.
1995]
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legal academics, especially those on the political left. It was, as
historian Daniel Rodgers has recognized, a paradigm shift that
was an almost inevitable response to the widespread dissatisfac-
tion with both liberalism and its existing alternatives.6 Civic
republicanism-with its emphasis on communities rather than
individuals-held out the promise of a non-Marxist, authentically
American, achievable alternative to the rampant individualist
excesses of late-twentieth-century liberalism. Not surprisingly, it
failed to live up to its promise, and today we are seeing articles
with titles such as "The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republican-
ism."7 How did we get here?
Since its inception, the central ideas of the republican para-
digm have been in dispute. Virtue, deliberation, and community
mean different things to different interpreters. The first neo-
republicans were philosophers who disagreed about both the
derivation and the scope of human virtue. Many of the earliest
virtue theorists-sometimes labelled "communitarians'--saw
virtue and community as an alternative to liberal Kantian theo-
ries. As Michael Sandel suggested, "the communitarian critics of
modern liberalism question the claim for the priority of the right
over the good."' Other philosophers have rejected that dichoto-
my, arguing that Kant also has a theory of virtue and of the
good.9 Nevertheless, while Kantians seem to view virtue as a
moral duty, Aristotelians see it as constitutive of human flourish-
ing."0 There are, moreover, significant differences even among
the Aristotelians. Some-who might be labelled traditional-
ists-see virtue as particular and local, not amenable to reasoned
deduction. Alasdair MacIntyre, for example, rejects even the
possibility of any universal moral principles, relying instead on
local traditions and hierarchies." Others, with a more univer-
6 Daniel Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J Am Hist 11, 12-13
(1992).
' Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U Pa L Rev
801 (1993).
s Michael J. Sandel, Introduction, in Michael J. Sandel, ed, Liberalism and Its Crit.
ics 5 (NYU, 1984).
See, for example, Richard Eldridge, On Moral Personhood: Philosophy, Literature,
Criticism, and Self-Understanding 34-63 (Chicago, 1989); Richard Eldridge, "Reading For
Life":" Martha C. Nussbaum on Philosophy and Literature, Arion J Humanities & Classics
187, 193 (Winter 1992).
10 See, for example, Ronald Beiner, The Moral Vocabulary of Liberalism, 34 Nomos
145, 156 (1992); George Sher, Knowing About Virtue, 34 Nomos 91, 98 (1992); Martha
Nussbaum, Virtue Revived, Times Literary Supp 9, 9-11 (July 3, 1992).
n Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue 260-80 (Notre Dame, 1981); Alasdair MacIntyre,
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, 1988). See also Philippa Foot, Virtues
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salist perspective, suggest that a true interpretation of the Aris-
totelian tradition does not entail rejecting either reason or uni-
versality. Human reason can indeed identify some universal
human needs and thus some universal human virtues.' The
trend today seems to be toward reconciliation; as Martha
Nussbaum puts it, we need not "choose between virtue and en-
lightenment."'
For their part, neo-republican historians could not even
agree initially on appropriate terms: "republicanism" eventually
won out over "country ideology," but not without a struggle.'4
Virtue-one of the few terms common to republicans of all stripes
but consequently among the most poorly defined-has been vari-
ously defined as selfless dedication to the public good, a proper
balance between private and public needs, or even a purely pri-
vate manifestation of an inner state of being. 5 As a matter of
history, moreover, neither "republican" nor "country" was used in
the eighteenth century to describe the tradition that twentieth-
century historians now mean by the terms. When "republic" and
"republican" were used in the eighteenth century, they were at
least as ill defined as they are in the twentieth: John Adams
wrote that "there is not in lexicography a more fraudulent word"
than republican. 6 Historians, too, now seem to be moving be-
and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy 130-31 n 6 (California, 1978).
12 See, for example, Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973.1980
(Cambridge, 1981); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in
Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge, 1986); Martha C. Nussbaum, Non-Relative
Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, 13 Midwest Stud in Phil 32 (1988); Martha Nussbaum,
Valuing Values: The Case for Reasoned Commitment (session paper delivered at AALS
Convention, Jan 10, 1993) (on file with U Chi L Rev); Beiner, 34 Nomos at 150 (cited in
note 10).
13 Nussbaum, Times Literary Supp at 11 (cited in note 10). See also Eldridge, On
Moral Personhood at 26-67 (cited in note 9); Michael J. Perry, Virtues and Relativism, 34
Nomos 117, 120 (1992); Gertrude Himmelfarb, On Looking into the Abyss: Untimely
Thoughts on Culture and Society 98-103 (Knopf, 1994) (noting that Mill stressed virtue
and restraint as well as liberty).
14 Compare J.GA. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought
and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975) ("country party"); Forrest McDon-
ald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 74-80 (Kansas,
1985) ("country party"); with Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of The American Republic
1776.1787 65-70 (North Carolina, 1969) ("republicanism"); Robert H. Horwitz, John Locke
and the Preservation of Liberty: A Perennial Problem of Civic Education, in Robert H.
Horwitz, ed, The Moral Foundations of the American Republic 129 (Virginia, 1977) ("re-
publicanism"); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology
79-90 (Cornell, 1978) ("republicanism"). Republicanism appears to be the currently favored
term. See, for example, Rodgers, 79 J Am Hist at 12-13 (cited in note 6).
' See Rodgers, 79 J Am Hist at 11 (cited in note 6). See also Shelley Burtt, The Poli-
tics of Virtue Today: A Critique and Proposal, 87 Am Pol Sci Rev 360, 365-67 (1993).
"6 Letter from John Adams to Samuel Adams (Oct 18, 1790), in Charles Francis
1995]
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yond conflict into consensus, recognizing that republicanism and
liberalism coexisted easily and un-self-consciously in the eigh-
teenth century, and that neither is a "paradigm" that fully de-
fines American thought of that time.'7
Legal academics, as is their wont, muddied the waters fur-
ther. Civic republicanism became the darling of the academic left
during the 1980s."5 In the process, however, it acquired new
characteristics-emphases on tolerance and deliberation promi-
nent among them-and lost some of its less savory historical as-
pects, especially those associated with elitism and exclusionary
limits on citizenship. 9
Two aspects of legal neo-republicanism have been especially
prominent: opposition to a somewhat caricatured version of the
previously dominant liberal, rights-oriented ideology, and a focus
on deliberative citizens making value-conscious choices. 0 Like
Adams, ed, 6 The Works of John Adams 415 (Little, Brown, 1851).
17 See Rodgers, 79 J Am Hist at 34-38 (cited in note 6); Joyce Abbleby, Liberalism
and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (Harvard, 1992); Ralph Ketcham,
Publius: Sustaining the Republican Principle, 44 Wm & Mary Q 576, 579-80 (1987). For
another review of the historiography of republicanism, see J. David Hoeveler, Jr., Original
Intent and the Politics of Republicanism, 75 Marq L Rev 863, 868-75 (1992).
" For an interesting analysis of this phenomenon, see G. Edward White, Reflections
on the "Republican Revival": Interdisciplinary Scholarship in the Legal Academy, 6 Yale J
L & Humanities 1, 13, 22 (1994).
"9 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L J
1539, 1564-65 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan
L Rev 29, 30-31 & n 8 (1986) ("A revival of republicanism must attempt to eliminate these
[unattractive] elements."). See also White, 6 Yale J L & Humanities at 25 (neo-repub-
licans "refashioned republican ideology to make it appear less archaic and thereby more
palatable"); Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 Mich
L Rev 685, 750-51 (1992) (suggesting that neo-republicans ultimately tried to purge unat-
tractive elements); H. Jefferson Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 Yale L J 1703, 1707
(1988) (neo-republicans select only those aspects of republicanism that conform to their
own political ideals); Kenneth L. Karst, Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the
Constitution 28, 31 (Yale, 1989) (American "civic culture" includes "individualism, egal-
itarianism, democracy, nationalism, and tolerance of diversity"); Hoeveler, 75 Marq L Rev
at 878-81 (neo-republicans try to fashion a "usable republicanism" with "progressive
applications").
' See, for example, Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Con-
stitutional Law (Harvard, 1988); Sunstein, 38 Stan L Rev at 30-31; Frank I. Michelman,
Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv L Rev 4, 27 (1986); Morton J. Horwitz,
Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 Wm & Mary L
Rev 57 (1987); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 Va L Rev 543, 548-50 (1986); Linda R. Hirshman, The Virtue of Liberali-
ty in American Communal Life, 88 Mich L Rev 983, 988-98 (1990); Joan C. Williams,
Virtue and Oppression, 34 Nomos 309 (1992). See also Bruce Ackerman, We the People:
Foundations 85-86 (Harvard, 1991) (citizen deliberation pivotal to constitutional theory);
Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 70-80 (Yale, 1980) (participation in
dialogue is condition of citizenship); Stephen M. Feldman, The Persistence of Power and
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the philosophers and historians, however, legal neo-republicans
have begun to realize-sometimes with help from their crit-
ics-that there is common ground between liberals and republi-
cans.2' Reconciling liberalism and republicanism-or rights and
virtue-is thus the newest cottage industry among constitutional
law professors.
Some critics have wondered whether such a reconciliation is
either possible or desirable." It is not my purpose to rehash, or
even to evaluate, those critiques. Instead, I take as a given that
some form of civic republicanism can and should be integrated
into our liberal regime and question only whether the current
attempts are likely to be successfulY The remainder of this Sec-
tion will explore the problematic nature of these attempts at
reconciliation.
Extant attempts to integrate liberalism and republicanism
suffer from two problems, one derived from each of the most
prominent aspects of neo-republicanism identified above. First,
the neo-republican ideal of deliberative democracy borders on the
utopian. The vast majority of Americans are neither inclined nor
equipped to engage in the kind of sustained, reasoned delibera-
the Struggle for Dialogic Standards in Postmodern Constitutional Jurisprudence:
Michelman, Habermas, and Civic Republicanism, 81 Georgetown L J 2243, 2246-51 (1993)
(charting Michelman's focus on dialogue).
21 See, for example, Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1561 (cited in note 19); Frank
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L J 1493, 1503-04 (1988); Symposium, Conceptions of
Democracy: The Case of Voting Rights, 41 U Fla L Rev 409 (1989); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 Harv L Rev 1695, 1696 (1989);
James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90
Colum L Rev 1463, 1552 & n 395 (1990); David A. Strauss, The Liberal Virtues, 34 Nomos
197 (1992); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in
Liberal Constitutionalism 254 (Oxford, 1990); William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes:
Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State 43 (Cambridge, 1991).
' See, for example, Gey, 141 U Pa L Rev at 845-55 (cited in note 7); Burtt, 87 Am
Pol Sci Rev at 361-62 (cited in note 15); Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or
the Flight From Substance, 97 Yale L J 1633, 1636-39 (1988); Kathryn Abrams, Law's
Republicanism, 97 Yale L J 1591, 1599-1602 (1988); Michael A. Fitts, Look Before You
Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on Civic Republicanism, 97 Yale L J 1651, 1652 (1988);
Burt Neuborne, Ghosts in the Attic: Idealized Pluralism, Community and Hate Speech, 27
Harv CR-CL L Rev 371, 371-77 (1992). See generally Terrance Sandalow, A Skeptical
Look at Contemporary Republicanism, 41 U Fla L Rev 523 (1989).
' Much of my own prior scholarship has in fact been devoted to exploring and
justifying the republican revival. See "Without Virtue There Can Be No Liberty," 78 Minn
L Rev 61 (1993); Rights Talk: Must We Mean What We Say?, 17 L & Soc Inquiry 491
(1992); Speaking of Virtue: A Republican Approach to University Regulation of Hate
Speech, 75 Minn L Rev 933 (1991); Outlaw Blues, 87 Mich L Rev 1418 (1989), reviewing
Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue (cited in note 20); Republican Citizenship in a Democratic
Society, 66 Tex L Rev 1229 (1988); An Essay Concerning Toleration, 71 Minn L Rev 963
(1987); 72 Va L Rev 543 (cited in note 20).
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tion contemplated by the republicans.' Moreover, republican
suggestions for promoting rational deliberation may actually
have the effect of "undermining public political participation,
especially among poorer groups."' The republican revival will
not go beyond a small corps of elite law professors if it does not
face up to the citizenry's lack of interest. However, neither of the
two most promising ways of coming to terms with that problem is
politically acceptable to most neo-republicans: either we could
acknowledge that real political participation will necessarily be
limited to the few because only the few are civic minded enough
to participate, or we might attempt to change the values of the
many so that they too are interested in participating in our ratio-
nal political discussions. The first solution conflicts with the egal-
itarianism of modern republicans, and the second with their
unwillingness to abandon the ethical relativism of modern liber-
alism."
The crux of the problem is that most neo-republicans are just
that: neo-republicans. They have abandoned the very aspects of
republicanism that made it a coherent doctrine. The new republi-
cans are simultaneously liberal (and postmodern) in their ulti-
mate denial of even the possibility of any abstract and universal
ethical truths,27 and republican in their wish to impose communi-
' See Burtt, 87 Am Pol Sci Rev at 365 (cited in note 15); Philip J. Weiser,
Ackerman's Proposal for Popular Constitutional Lawmaking: Can It Realize His Aspira-
tions for Dualist Democracy?, 68 NYU L Rev 907, 925-35 (1993); Robin West, Progressive
Constitutionalism: Reconstructing the Fourteenth Amendment 288-89 (Duke, 1994);
Sherry, 78 Minn L Rev at 75 (cited in note 23). See also Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of
Liberalism Past, 105 Harv L Rev 918, 930 & n 35 (1992).
' Fitts, 97 Yale L J at 1652 (cited in note 22). See also Neuborne, 27 Harv CR-CL L
Rev at 389-90 & n 92 (cited in note 22). Neo-republicans, who are generally very egalitari-
an, would find this result a serious drawback to their theories. Eighteenth-century Ameri-
can republicans would have been more sanguine about such a consequence, and indeed
might have expected it; republicanism was originally rather elitist and exclusionary by
twentieth-century standards.
' One scholar has suggested that both Sunstein and Michelman initially accepted
the original republican notion that only the few would possess the virtues of republican
citizenship, but that both have more recently tried to democratize their theories by
making them more procedural and less substantive. Gardbaum, 90 Mich L Rev at 750-51
(cited in note 19).
' See, for example, Michelman, 97 Yale L J at 1504 (cited in note 21) ("I do not know
what is good for the soul. I do not know in what (if anything) personal freedom essentially
consists. I do not know whether citizenship is a fundamental human good."). Sunstein has
hinted that he does not subscribe to this sort of postmodern skepticism. Cass R. Sunstein,
On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv L Rev 741, 773 n 113 (1993) (disagreement over
correct answers in law or ethics does not mean there are no correct answers); id at 779-80
n 130 (rejecting postmodernist denial of the possibility of normativity). However, most of
his republican scholarship seems to imply that law and morality are largely a matter of
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ty values on individuals.' The moral skepticism of traditional
liberals led them to endorse government neutrality; traditional
republicans, by contrast, preferred normative government deci-
sion making because of their certainty that objectively correct
moral values could be identified. The new republicans, on the
other hand, simultaneously endorse both ethical relativism and
normative government decision making. This amalgamation of
liberal epistemology and republican political philosophy seems to
generate either unfettered majoritarianism or totalitarianism
(depending on whose contingent values are imposed), but neo-
republicans deny that either is an acceptable form of government.
They have failed to recognize that republicanism-especially the
particularist version, which is all that is available to relativist
neo-republicans-is, at base, a thoroughly conservative doc-
societally influenced "preferences." See, for example, Sunstein, 38 Stan L Rev at 82-84
(cited in note 19); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U Chi
L Rev 1129, 1135-36 (1986). This in turn suggests that morality is historically contingent.
Moreover, Sunstein seems to concede that even if there are objective moral truths, they
are unknowable by mere mortals. Sunstein, 106 Harv L Rev at 773 n 113.
Ackerman presents a more complex picture of liberal neutrality, in which only public
dialogue about public questions need be neutral. See, for example, Bruce A. Ackerman,
What Is Neutral About Neutrality?, 93 Ethics 372, 388-90 (1983). Although this leaves
individuals free to adopt more substantive philosophies, it still rules many substantive
arguments out of bounds in public debate. More recently, Ackerman has reaffirmed the
basic liberal principle that no vision of the good life is better than any other. See Bruce A.
Ackerman, Political Liberalisms 91 J Phil 364, 365 (1994). See also text accompanying
note 113.
Other scholars have noted the neo-republican rejection of substantive values. See, for
example, Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory
and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 Cal L Rev 331, 357 (1994) (neo-
republicans "question the significance of absolute or transcendent standards for distin-
guishing correct from incorrect moral and political judgments"); Hirshman, 88 Mich L Rev
at 985 (cited in note 20) ("civic republicanism stops short of articulating the ends to which
the community should aspire"); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle that Shut Me
Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 Harv L
Rev 581, 665 (1993) (neo-republicans, like liberals, are committed to "subjectivist and
historicist" attitudes, which treat "truth" as historically and culturally contingent).
' Some scholars would ascribe the contradiction between value-neutrality and value-
imposition to all post-Enlightenment republicans, including the eighteenth-century ones.
See MacIntyre, After Virtue (cited in note 11); John Patrick Diggins, The Lost Soul of
American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism 31 (Chicago,
1984).
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trine.2 9 It is no wonder that attempts to appropriate it for the
political left have been conspicuously unsuccessful.
Virtue-based theories in their original form depended on a
known, natural, and unquestioned hierarchy of values. To mod-
ern, left-leaning neo-republicans, however, the existence of such a
hierarchy is untenable. Shorn of that base, a theory of virtue
then becomes nothing more than the embodiment of its author's
own predilictions. As MacIntyre pointed out, liberalism and its
attendant emphasis on government neutrality and toleration are
inevitable responses to the loss of faith in a human telos and
objective ethical truths. ° Neo-republicans cannot have it both
ways.
Analogously, it is difficult if not impossible to reconcile the
radical egalitarianism of most neo-republicans with a political
theory that values individual virtue. Any theory that purports to
value virtue requires us to reward the virtuous over the
unvirtuous. Unless one believes that all humans possess and
effortlessly exercise exactly the same amount of virtue, a system
that values virtue will result in significant differentials among
citizens in both tangible and intangible rewards. As one commen-
tator put it: "Some people are better than others. They deserve
more of society's rewards, of which money is only one small
part."3' Equality of opportunity is consistent with such a theory;
equality of outcome is not. Even a cursory reading of the scholar-
ship of most neo-republicans, however, suggests quite strongly
that they support the latter. Akhil Amar, for example, endorses a
form of republicanism that includes mandatory redistrbution of property.3
2 See Gey, 141 U Pa L Rev at 804 (cited in note 7); Linda K. Kerber, Making Repub-
licanism Useful, 97 Yale L J 1663, 1667 ("A reader of Sunstein's essay cannot help but
ask what a progressive like himself is doing in republican company."); id at 1668-71. The
interactions between liberal politics and conservative political theory provide a fascinating
sidelight on the modern debate over republicanism and its close cousin, communitarian-
ism. Maclntyre, one of the earliest neo-republicans, is a one-time neo-Marxist with strong
Thomist inclinations. For evidence of MacIntyre's neo-Mandst beginnings, see, for exam-
ple, Alasdair MacIntyre, Marxism and Christianity vii (Schocken Books, 1968); Alasdair
C. MacIntyre, Marxism: An Interpretation (SCM, 1953). For evidence of his more recent
Thomist leanings, see MacIntyre, Whose Justice? at 183-208, 402-03 (cited in note 11). See
also Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism 89 (Harvard, 1993) (MacIntyre "has
traveled, basically, from Christianity to Marxism and back."). Several of the nonlegal
scholars on whom I rely in this Article have impeccable leftist credentials but have more
recently been producing scholarship that many in academia view as quite conservative.
'0 MacIntyre, After Virtue (cited in note 11).
" Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980 234 (Basic
Books, 1984).
' Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal
Entitlements, 13 Harv J L & Pub Policy 37, 37 (1990). See also Cass R. Sunstein, The
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Recent attempts to integrate republicanism and liberalism
similarly founder on the question of what to do about liberalism's
focus on rights and government neutrality. Some neo-republicans
simply recast virtue in terms of liberal neutrality, defining it as
equal respect for all individual visions of the good life.' This co-
opts the language of civic republicanism but misses the main
point: most neo-republicans (to say nothing of most original re-
publicans) find an explicit contrast between liberal value-neutral-
ity and republican virtue. A republicanism that makes no dis-
tinctions between virtuous and unvirtuous lives is hardly worthy
of the name: it is merely traditional liberalism masquerading as
a republican reconciliation.
The more typical republican emphasis on value-conscious
choices has problems too. As some critics have noted, a prefer-
ence for community (or majority) value choices shades too easily
into totalitarianism.' Many neo-republicans try to avoid this by
(in the words of one critic) heroically "concentrat[ing] on process
and deliberation to the exclusion of substantive concerns."
35
Such a project is inevitably doomed because there is neither a
justification for any particular process (even a process that en-
courages deliberation) without an attachment to substantive
values, nor any way to deal with the problem of "bad" outcomes
(except to deny that they could ever occur if we adopt the right
procedures-a naive assumption at best and a dangerous one at
worst)." The naivete of this position reflects an unwillingness to
Partial Constitution 78-79, 149-51, 156-57, 331-32, 344 (Harvard, 1993) (supporting affir-
mative action beyond equal opportunity).
See, for example, Liebman, 90 Colum L Rev at 1554-57 (cited in note 21). This kind
of neutrality is a hallmark of liberalism. See, for example, John Rawls, Justice as Fair-
ness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 Phil & Pub Aff 223, 230 (1985); John Rawls, Kantian
Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J Phil 515, 521 (1980).
' See, for example, Gey, 141 U Pa L Rev at 875 (cited in note 7):
Although they do not acknowledge the affinity, Sunstein and Michelman have a com-
patriot in Robert Bork. The civic republicans share with Bork the following premise:
1'ruth is what the majority thinks it is at any given moment precisely because the
majority is permitted to govern and to redefine its values constantly."
See also authorities cited in Stolzenberg, 106 Harv L Rev at 658 n 404 (cited in note 27);
Don Herzog, Some Questions for Republicans, 14 Pol Theory 473, 487-90 (1986).
' Epstein, 97 Yale L J at 1633 (cited in note 22). See also James E. Fleming, Con-
structing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex L Rev 211, 249-50 (1993) (suggesting that
Sunstein's more recent work is still oriented toward process rather than substance). Nota-
bly, although Epstein and Fleming agree that Sunstein's work neglects substance, they
disagree about why that is wrong. See id at 249-52.
' For a somewhat different account of how republicanism takes insufficient account
of the possibility that deliberation might fail to reach correct results, see William N.
1995]
The University of Chicago Law Review
believe that genuine moral conflicts exist, a position in stark
contrast to the thoroughgoing relativism of most neo-republicans.
Again, neo-republicans are trying to legislate a morality that, at
bottom, they believe is completely historically and culturally
contingent.
The neo-republican fascination with community values as the
antidote to liberal individualism also creates a related problem:
how to deal with individual rights. Rights are the traditional
liberal bulwark against totalitarianism, and most neo-republicans
recognize, with Frank Michelman, that republicanism cannot
reject rights entirely: "Theorizing a comfortable place for individ-
ual legal rights within a republican constitutional vision is a task
that has never been completed. No republican revival in Ameri-
can constitutional law is likely to last very long without major
progress in that task."37 Despite this purported recognition of
the importance of individual rights, neither the theoretical nor
the doctrinal 'work of neo-republicans fits comfortably with a
jurisprudence of rights. As one critic concluded after an extensive
review of the literature, "Sunstein's skepticism about
rights.., casts doubt on many, if not most modern constitutional
rights." 8 And although he uses Sunstein as an example, he
finds the same tendency in other republicans, no matter how
much they deny it. 9
This inability to accommodate rights without retreating back
into liberalism is, I believe, endemic to neo-republicanism for the
same reason that republicans can neither accommodate citizen
apathy nor adequately draw a line between communitarianism
and totalitarianism: the moral skepticism of the new republicans.
If there are no universal ethical truths, then democracy needs a
mediating device to avoid totalitarianism. Traditionally, that
device has been the protection of individual rights, especially
rights of speech and conscience. But the new republicans, be-
cause of their paradoxical adherence to liberal epistemology and
republican politics, are caught in a double trap when they try to
account for rights. First, republican politics makes many rights
(especially speech rights) inconvenient because they can interfere
with the formation and maintainance of the political community
Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 Stan L Rev 607, 625, 637-44 (1994).
Michelman, 100 Harv L Rev at 43 n 229 (cited in note 20).
Gey, 141 U Pa L Rev at 855 (cited at note 7).
Id at 842, 872-73 & n 245. See also Martin H. Redish and Gary Lippman, Freedom
of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous
Implications, 79 Cal L Rev 267, 268-72 (1991).
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that is necessary for a republican polity.4" On the other hand,
liberal epistemology yields an almost infinite diversity of values.
This leads neo-republicans to create new rights protective of that
diversity (especially group rights).4 These new rights, however,
are themselves in conflict with a republican political community
since they are likely to lead to exclusion and balkanization.
The only approach to rights that might have some suc-
cess-other than the standard liberal approach which I (and most
republicans) reject for reasons that will become clear in the next
Section-is one that recognizes that there are right and wrong
answers to moral questions. As religion scholar Steven
Rockefeller puts it: "No idea of the good is above criticism, but
this does not lead to a directionless relativism. Through experi-
ence with the aid of experimental intelligence, one can find ample
grounds for making objective value judgments in any particular
situation."42 Such an approach, because it abandons the rela-
tivism of liberalism and returns to at least a mild version of the
moral certitude of older virtue theories, avoids the paradox I
identified as inherent in neo-republican theories. Thus, what I
will call responsible republicanism can offer principles by which
to judge both claims of right and governmental decisions de-
signed to affect individual behavior, about which liberals and
tolerant neo-republicans can make no moral judgments.
It is much easier to suggest that we ought to have such a
theory than to construct one. The moral certitude of the earlier
republican eras is irretrievably lost; we no longer have the faith
in God, natural law, or even a human telos that lent virtue its
"' See generally Sunstein, The Partial Constitution at 243-53, 261-70 (cited in note
32); Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U Chi L Rev 795, 802 (1993); Cass R.
Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 Phil & Pub Aff 3, 31-32 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein,
Free Speech Now, 59 U Chi L Rev 255, 259-63 (1992); Frank I. Michelman, Universities,
Racist Speech and Democracy in America: An Essay for the ACLU, 27 Harv CR-CL L Rev
339, 343-45 (1992); Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitu-
tional Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 Tenn L Rev 291, 295-96 (1989).
41 See, for example, Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1580-81, 1585-88 (cited in note 19);
Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal: Romance, Community, and Tradition in William J.
Brennan, Jr.'s Constitutional Thought, 77 Va L Rev 1261, 1297-1306 (1991). Michelman
denies that affirmative action necessarily implicates group rights, 77 Va L Rev at 1284-96,
but as long as membership in a particular group is sufficient to entitle an individual to
the benefits of affirmative action-regardless of whether she has ever suffered or been
discriminated against because of her group membership-then group rights are implicat-
ed.
' Steven C. Rockefeller, Comment, in Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and "The Pol-
itics of Recognition" 87, 92 (Princeton, 1992).
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incontestability in the past. "[I]t looks as if we are all we
have.... God help us."'
But all is not lost. If we can use the pragmatists' tools' to
construct situated, not abstract, truths that we are nevertheless
comfortable labelling (at least tentatively) "universal," perhaps
we can move forward. This approach is neither a return to rela-
tivism45 nor an endorsement of MacIntyre's purely particularist
virtues.4" Nor need it be monistic or in conflict with diverse
forms of human flourishing.47 Finally, it need not be authoritari-
an, for that would "give us order at the price of reason."' As the
philosopher Martha Nussbaum suggests, we need not adopt the
philosophy-common to such otherwise different thinkers as
Robert Bork and Stanley Fish-that "if not the heavens, then the
abyss."49 Pragmatism allows us to function without either abso-
lute moral certitude or absolute moral skepticism. A pragmatist
view of morality is, in Jack Balkin's words, "concerned with those
indeterminate values or urges located in the human soul, which
human beings articulate through positive morality and cultural
conventions, and which nevertheless always escape this articula-
tion."0 Pragmatism is a particularly appropriate way to ap-
proach the dilemmas of neo-republicanism because pragmatism
and republicanism have much in common, including an emphasis
on community traditions and independent rational delibera-
tion."
4 Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 Duke L J 1229, 1249. An
alternative account links the loss of authority to opposition to traditional rights and the
waning importance of principles and conviction. See generally Robert Nisbet, Twilight of
Authority (Oxford, 1975).
" See, for example, Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72
Minn L Rev 1331, 1334-56 (1988); Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism In Ameri-
can Legal Thought, 63 S Cal L Rev 1569 (1990); Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry,
Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 Stan L Rev 807, 820-24
(1993).
' See Martha Minow and Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S Cal L Rev 1597,
1634-39 (1990).
46 See Putnam, 63 S Cal L Rev at 1678-80 (cited in note 2).
4 Beiner, 34 Nomos at 149-50 (cited in note 10). See also Perry, 34 Nomos at 121-22
(cited in note 13); Sher, 34 Nomos at 106-12 (cited in note 10).
' Martha Nussbaum, Recoiling from Reason, NY Rev of Books 36, 41 (Dec 7, 1989),
reviewing MacIntyre, Whose Justice? (cited in note 11).
"' Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and in the
Law, 107 Harv L Rev 714, 730 (1994).
' J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 Mich L Rev
1131, 1139 (1994) (describing his own version of deconstruction, which is close to the
pragmatist approach I am advocating here).
" See generally Daniel Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the 21st
Century, 1995 U Ill L Rev (forthcoming). Republicanism and pragmatism also have, in
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The pragmatist approach to virtue asks, with Nussbaum,
"What are the most common problems of human life and what is
a good way to face them?"52 It then crafts answers through con-
temporary and historical observation, reflection, reason, and
judgment. To the extent that we are focusing on common human
dilemmas, our answers will be universal. But because we derive
both the questions and the answers from actual human existence
rather than abstract principles, our truths are situated or contex-
tual. One can be an ethical objectivist without necessarily being a
Platonist.
There is, of course, no guarantee of success. Any answers we
come up with will be contested. All we can do-and all I hope to
do in the next Section-is to marshal the best available evidence
in support of a particular vision of virtue and open the floor to
challengers.53
B. Responsibility
In crafting a vision of virtue, we need not (nor can we) speci-
fy every detail of a virtuous life or a virtuous nation. Indeed, I
believe that we can make significant progress toward reinvigorat-
ing republicanism and reconciling it with liberalism by focusing
on only one virtue: responsibility. In particular, responsibility can
serve as a much-needed counterweight to the liberal focus on
rights, without denying or displacing our proud heritage of indi-
vidual rights.
If the neo-republicans have trouble with individual rights,
they are not alone. Despite all the benefits of our jurisprudence
of individual rights, the American obsession with rights has got-
ten out of hand. Individual rights are now a shibboleth, invoked
indiscriminately and often inappropriately to shield citizens from
every real and imagined slight, from their own folly, and from
life's inevitable hardships. Mary Ann Glendon nicely summarizes
the ills that result from our tendency to treat rights as absolute,
individual, and divorced from responsibilities:
Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic
expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue
Aristotle, a common ancestor. See generally Gaston, 82 Cal L Rev 331 (cited in note 27).Nussbaum, Times Literary Supp at 10 (cited in note 10). For a similar approach to
a theory of judicial review, see Fleming, 72 Tex L Rev at 252-60 (cited in note 35).
' Isn't that what scholarship is all about? See Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan L Rev at
849-54 (cited in note 44).
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that might lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at
least the discovery of common ground. In its silence concern-
ing responsibilities, it seems to condone acceptance of the
benefits of living in a democratic social welfare state,
without accepting the corresponding personal and civic obli-
gations. In its relentless individualism, it fosters a climate
that is inhospitable to society's losers, and that systematical-
ly disadvantages caretakers and dependents, young and old.
In its neglect of civil society, it undermines the principal
seedbeds of civic and personal virtue. In its insularity, it
shuts out potentially important aids to the process of self-
correcting learning. All of these traits promote mere asser-
tion over reason-giving."
When smokers and nonsmokers square off by claiming opposing
rights; when groups claim rights for animals, polluters, embryos,
(pick your own favorite); when the American flag is said to stand
for "the right to do what we want";55 when a lawyer argues in
court that birth parents have "a God-given constitutional right to
a meaningful relationship" with a fourteen-year-old daughter
they did not raise and who wants nothing to do with them;56
when a prominent law professor publishes a book suggesting that
employers have a natural right to discriminate, 57 we have too
many rights. This exaggerated focus on individual rights seems
to be a peculiarly American (or Anglo-American, by some ac-
counts) phenomenon: cross-cultural studies show that "by a va-
Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 14
(Free Press, 1991). See also Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 Yale L J
293, 294-97 (1988); Beiner, 34 Nomos at 147-48 (cited in note 10); Charles Moskos, A Call
to Civic Service: National Service for Country and Community 4-8 (Free Press, 1988);
Digby Anderson, Introduction and Summary of Contents, in Digby Anderson, ed, The Loss
of Virtue: Moral Confusion and Social Disorder in Britain and America xvii, xviii-xix
(Social Affairs Unit, 1992); Thomas L. Pangle, The Ennobling Democracy: The Challenge
of the Postmodern Era 158 (Johns Hopkins, 1992). Glendon's argument is that the prob-
lems stem from our discourse about rights, rather than our actual beliefs. Rights Talk at
14-17. Beiner suggests instead that "the resort to the language of rights as the dominant
moral and political vocabulary is merely a symptomatic expression of" our underlying so-
cial beliefs. Beiner, 34 Nomos at 147 (cited in note 10).
Glendon, Rights Talk at 8.
Final Arguments Are Heard at Adoption Trial in Florida, NY Times A10 (Aug 11,
1993). It is interesting to contrast this claim with Katharine Bartlett's proposal that "we
re-direct the law applicable to parental status toward a view of parenthood based on
responsibility," and "focus on parental responsibility rather than reciprocal 'rights.'"
Bartlett, 98 Yale L J at 295.
"' Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimi-
nation Laws 24-27, 133-35 (Harvard, 1992).
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riety of measures, typical contemporary Americans place a higher
value on individual fulfillment and personal equality than citi-
zens of any other nation."'
Political scientist Ronald Beiner describes the consequences
of our unthinking reliance on rights by asking the reader to
imagine two contrasting discussions: first, a discussion "between
two individuals of differing political persuasions concerning
whether it would be good (for the society as a whole) for the state
to make available a certain social service (say, universal state-
funded daycare)"; second, a "contest between, on the one side, the
right of one of the parties to receive the service in question, and,
on the other side, the right of the other party not to be burdened
by the higher taxes necessary to supply the service."" Which
scenario is more likely to result in compromise, or at least in con-
structive suggestions about common ground?"° Rights have be-
come both too trivialized to do the real work of protecting individ-
uals against government tyranny and too absolute and ad-
versarial to allow for any further discussion. As Glendon puts it,
American discourse about rights is "the language of no compro-
mise. The winner takes all and the loser has to get out of town.
The conversation is over."6'
' Edward A. Wynne and Kevin Ryan, Reclaiming Our Schools: A Handbook on
Teaching Character, Academics, and Discipline 14 (1993). Wynne and Ryan describe one
particularly interesting study that illustrates how Americans compare to other cultures in
balancing individual rights and responsibilities:
In one study, Americans working together on group projects were asked to estimate
their contribution (in percentages) to their project. When the figures are summed up,
they typically total more than 100%. In other words, Americans believe they do more
than their share.... Conversely, in other societies, the study found, team members
underestimate their individual contributions. The sum of estimates is usually less
than 100%. Presumably, these respondents do not believe they are doing enough for
the group.
Id. As Wynne and Ryan point out, this is likely to lead many Americans to feel that they
are being exploited. Id. It is easy to see how such feelings of doing more than one's share
and not being appropriately recognized can lead to a rather unbalanced view of rights
versus responsibilities.
9 Beiner, 34 Nomos at 147-48 (cited in note 10).
For an example of how setting aside rights talk and working for common ground
might work in practice, see Kurt Chandler, Abortion Talks Are Calm Eye of the Storm,
Minneapolis Star Trib 1B (Aug 2, 1993) (pro-life and pro-choice activists meeting privately
to explore common ground).
" Glendon, Rights Talk at 9 (cited in note 54). This tendency toward absolutes and
away from dialogue seems to have infected even a genre of scholarship far removed from
"rights talk": storytelling. See Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan L Rev at 851 & n 233 (cited in
note 44).
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A concomitant of our fascination with rights is the loss of
any notion of responsibility. 2 Everyone now has rights, but no
one has responsibilities. This form of radical individualism is a
twentieth-century innovation. 3 Traditionally, citizenship carried
both rights and responsibilities. Individuals were expected to
work hard and to take responsibility for themselves, their fami-
lies, and their community. Failure to do so-or to strive to do so
even if one ultimately failed-was seen as irresponsible and im-
moral. Work and other responsible behavior were expected even
of the very poor, and irresponsible behavior marked one as unde-
serving." Citizenship was so intertwined with responsibility
that working-and earning a living-was considered a necessary
prerequisite for full citizenship.65 Even today, the most success-
ful immigrant groups prize work. Among Indochinese refugee
families, for example, "[hiaving a job and being able to provide
for the family is integral to family pride. Shame is felt by Asian
families on welfare."66
We have lost that assumption of individual responsibility
and with it, our virtue. Someone or something else is always to
blame: everyone is a victim. "For the Left the villain is capitalism
and for the Right it is welfare; both are ways of avoiding the
conclusion that wicked and irresponsible choices are made by
wicked and irresponsible individuals."" But, as Harvey
6 One British writer notes a telling example: "When I entered the word 'DUTY' into
the University's on-line catalogue the screen responded with the phrase 'DUTY FREE'.
This is perhaps as accurate a comment on contemporary attitudes to the notion of duty as
we are likely to find." Jon Davies, Duty and Self-Sacrifice For Country: The New Dispar-
agement of Public Ideals, in Digby Anderson, ed, The Loss of Virtue: Moral Confusion and
Social Disorder in Britain and America 69, 71 (Social Affairs Unit, 1992).
6 For excellent general discussions of the older tradition of limited individualism, see
William J. Novak, Public Economy and the Well-ordered Market: Law and Economic
Regulation in 19th-Centuy America, 18 L & Soc Inquiry 1 (1993); William J. Novak,
Common Regulation: Legal Origins of State Power in America, 45 Hastings L J 1061
(1994).
6 See, for example, Theodore R. Marmor, Jerry L. Mashaw, and Philip L. Harvey,
America's Misunderstood Welfare State: Persistent Myths, Enduring Realities 23-25, 86
(Basic Books, 1990); Murray, Losing Ground at 180 (cited in note 31). See also Frederick
P. Close, The Case For Moral Education, Responsive Community Rts & Responsibilities
23, 24 (Winter 1993-94) ("Americans in the 1830s viewed criminal activity as the result of
willful actions of individuals who lacked self-control and good character.").
- Judith Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion (Harvard, 1991);
Lawrence M. Mead, Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship 242-44
(Free Press, 1986); Linda R. Hirshman, Nobody in Here But Us Chickens: Legal Education
and the Virtues of the Ruler, 45 Stan L Rev 1905, 1919-21 (1993).
' Nathan Caplan, Marcella H. Choy, and John K. Whitmore, Indochinese Refugee
Families and Academic Achievement, Scientific Am 36, 41 (Feb 1992).
' Christie Davies, Moralization and Demoralization: A Moral Explanation for Crime,
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Mansfield has pointed out, "[vlictims do not behave as citi-
zens."8 Moreover, absolving an individual of responsibility on
the basis of victimhood essentially denies that the individual is a
rational actor capable of self-governance.69 Though victimhood
may confer power,7" it also implies that the individual lacks the
basic capacities for republican citizenship. We cannot reclaim our
virtue or shed our socially impoverishing obsession with rights
unless we return to a notion of individual responsibility.7'
Nor can we regain our virtue unless we reinvigorate the
concept of community responsibility, which also has diminished
in recent years. The two lapses are connected in several ways. To
the extent that members of a community fail to take responsibili-
ty for one another, they increase the need for weaker or more
vulnerable members to demand-to claim as a right-that which
the society ought, but fails, to give them. The loss of community
responsibility thus leads us to blur the important distinction be-
tween a community obligation to give charity (or anything else of
value) and an individual right to receive it, encouraging mis-
placed reliance on the latter.72 Moreover, when a community
abdicates its responsibilities, it sets a poor example for its indi-
vidual members.
It is almost a truism that we have lost the language of re-
sponsibility, both individual and community. Others have can-
vassed the evidence for, and the consequences of, that loss.
Glendon's careful analysis shows how American law focuses on
rights to the exclusion of responsibility. 3 Charles Sykes docu-
Disorder, and Social Problems, in Digby Anderson, ed, The Loss of Virtue: Moral Confu-
sion and Social Disorder in Britain and America 3, 7 (Social Affairs Unit, 1992).
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., America's Constitutional Soul 86 (Johns Hopkins, 1991).
For an enlightening exploration of this idea in the context of the battered woman
defense, see Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 Cal L Rev 1 (1994). For a discussion
of the relationship between responsibility, excuse, and rationality, see Stephen J. Morse,
Culpability and Control, 142 U Pa L Rev 1587 (1994).
70 See, for example, Shelby Steele, The Content of Our Character: A New Vision of
Race in America 5-15 (St. Martin's, 1990). See also Richard Rodriguez, Days of Obligation:
An Argument With My Mexican Father 70 (Viking, 1992) ("Without the myth of victimiza-
tion-who are we? We are no longer Mexicans.").
" This is not to say that we ought to abandon the idea of rights altogether. Indeed,
as Linda McClain has noted, rights and responsibility are inextricably connected, not
least because "the freedom that rights provide makes possible the exercise of responsibili-
ty." Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 Duke L J 989, 994 (1994). I contend
only that the balance between rights and responsibility has gone awry.
" See, for example, Mark Almond, Discretion: Quietly Discriminating Between the De.
serving and the Undeserving Poor, in Digby Anderson, ed, The Loss of Virtue: Moral
Confusion and Social Disorder in Britain and America 203, 209 (Social Affairs Unit,
1992).
"' Glendon, Rights Talk (cited in note 54). For a contrary view, which suggests that
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ments how large segments of the population try to claim
victimhood and to shift responsibility to others,74 while Martha
Minow shows how focusing on victimhood diminishes the capacity
for both responsibility and choice.75 Shelby Steele notes that
clinging to victimhood is a way of avoiding personal accountabili-
ty.76 Steele and Jim Sleeper both argue that the culture of
victimhood has poisoned race relations and harmed the cause of
equality.77 And even a cursory review of recent legal academic
work suggests that most scholars-republican or not-reject any
notion of holding individuals accountable for their own choices.78
The Stanford Law Review recently published an article on
Afrocentric schools that blames educational failures on everyone
except the students themselves (who may be at least partly at
fault).79 A recent issue of the Yale Law Journal contains an arti-
cle that disparages welfare reforms designed to encourage mar-
riage, education, medical care, and birth control as penalizing
those who do not "conform to majoritarian middle-class val-
ues."8" Such reforms, claims the author, are based on "the myth
that social problems ... are caused by the deviant behavior of
welfare recipients."8  Even some of the scholarship on
any decline in responsibility is due to social causes unrelated to rights, see McClain, 43
Duke L J at 989-94 (cited in note 71).
' Charles J. Sykes, A Nation of Victims: The Decay of the American Character 11-15
(St. Martin's, 1992). Sykes points out that one of the consequences of so many people
claiming victim status is that real victims are neglected. Id at 18-20, 128.34.
7 Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L Rev 1411, 1427-31 (1993). As
she eloquently notes, "[v]ictimhood is a cramped identity." Id at 1432.
" Steele, The Content of Our Character at 23-35 (cited in note 70).
71 Id at 26, 127-48; Jim Sleeper, The Closest of Strangers: Liberalism and the Politics
of Race in New York 201-02, 206 (Norton, 1990). See also Glenn C. Loury, Free At Last?,
94 Commentary 30, 32-33 (1992).
7'8 There are, of course, admirable exceptions. Although Kenneth Karst's thoughtful
book on citizenship stresses the rights of citizenship, it also links those rights to responsi-
ble behavior by citizens. See, for example, Karst, Belonging to America at 51, 129, 132-33,
140-41 (cited in note 19).
71 Michael John Weber, Immersed in an Educational Crisis: Alternative Programs for
African-American Males, 45 Stan L Rev 1099, 1100-02, 1128-31 (1993). The article focuses
on schools exclusively for boys and never wonders why it is that African-American girls,
although they suffer under the double yoke of racism and sexism, seem to achieve better
than boys. Id at 118-21. This failure illustrates our blindness to individual responsibility.
' Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform
Proposals, 102 Yale L J 719, 720-21 (1992).
" Id at 727. Professor Williams makes this claim despite overwhelming evidence that
some of these nonconforming behaviors-especially single parenthood-have a devastating
effect on the children's life chances. See Gerald David Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, Jr.,
eds, A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society 525 (National Academy, 1989)
('[Als compared with children of two-parent families, children from one-parent families
have lower scores on standardized tests of IQ and educational achievement, lower educa-
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scholarship denies that there is any such thing as individual
merit, and consequently argues that we should not make judg-
ments about scholarship.2
Rights have also displaced the sense of social responsibility
we once possessed. Individuals are no longer expected to take
responsibility for either their communities or other community
members. It is, for example, commonplace among many econo-
mists to observe that, as Milton Friedman put it, "[f]ew trends
could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free
society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social respon-
sibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders
as possible."' Because the stockholders have a right to their
earnings and the community at large no right to be free of what-
ever unethical practices are being challenged, these economists
conclude that the answer is clear cut: the presence or absence of
rights pretermits any discussion of responsibility. Similarly, nei-
ther private individuals nor government officials are generally
required to render aid to fellow citizens-no matter how dire the
tional attainment, lower occupational status and income, and higher rates of early mar-
riage, births to unmarried women, and marital dissolution."). See also id at 290, 523-25,
546; William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass,
and Public Policy 71-72 (Chicago, 1987); Mead, Beyond Entitlement at 36-37 (cited in note
65); Murray, Losing Ground at 130-33 (cited in note 31); Marian Wright Edelman, Fami-
lies in Peril: An Agenda for Social Change 3-6 (Harvard, 1987) ("The crux of the problem
facing the black family today is that young black women who become pregnant do not
marry nearly as often as they used to."); id at 52-53, 56-57; Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of
Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda 62 (Crown, 1993)
(children of unmarried or divorced parents are more at risk educationally); Douglas J.
Besharov, The Moral Voice of Welfare Reform, Responsive Community Rts & Responsibili-
ties 13 (Spring 1993); Mary Jo Bane and David T. Ellwood, One Fifth of the Nation's
Children: Why Are They Poor?, 245 Science 1047, 1051 (Sept 8, 1989) ("the large and
growing proportions of children born to unmarried mothers ... represent the greatest
long-term threat to our children's economic security"); Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles
Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life 138-39 (Free
Press, 1994) (white mothers without a husband are three to ten times more likely to be in
poverty than married white mothers). The children of single-parent families are also at
higher risk for dropping out of school or delinquency, thus ensuring another generation of
poverty. See Jaynes and Williams, A Common Destiny at 543; James S. Coleman, The
Creation and Destruction of Social Capital: Implications for the Law, 3 Notre Dame J L
Ethics & Pub Policy 375, 380 (1988).
' See, for example, authorities cited in Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan L Rev at 841-42
(cited in note 44). See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91
Colum L Rev 1060, 1067-68 (1991); Richard Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on
Common Cause, 44 Vand L Rev 1, 8-9 (1991); Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the
Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 Harv CR-CL L Rev 295, 364-
68, 380-85 (1988).
' Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 133 (Chicago, 1962). See also Richard
A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 419-21 (Little, Brown, 4th ed 1992).
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situation nor how easy the offer of aid."4 This abdication of com-
munity responsibility is most often justified by denying that the
recipient has a right to the aid, with nary a mention of the possi-
bility that there may be a responsibility to act even if there is no
corresponding right. 5
The economic policies of the last two decades have contribut-
ed to the flight from social responsibility. Members of the "me
generation,"' encouraged by a weakening of laws protecting the
weak, the poor, and the powerless from predatory economic ac-
tions,87 have come to believe that what matters most is making
money. "Whoever dies with the most toys wins," the Wall Street
slogan of the 1980s, is a crystalline description of the moral vacu-
um spawned by the Reagan-Bush years."
The loss of individual and community responsibility has been
much lamented. What has not been so widely noted is that the
neo-republicans, for all their emphasis on virtue and community
responsibility, are similarly unwilling to hold individuals ac-
countable." Sunstein's recent book, for example, is a condemna-
tion of what he calls "status quo neutrality," on the ground that
it fails to take into account prior injustice."° A more "responsible
republican" position might at least address the question of
" For an excellent discussion of this at both the individual and state level, see
Glendon, Rights Talk at 87-98 (cited in note 54). For a suggestion that the absence of a
duty to rescue is in fact inconsistent with earlier traditions, see Steven J. Heyman,
Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 Vand L Rev 673, 682-85 (1994).
' See, for example, Richard Epstein, Rights and Rights Talk, 105 Harv L Rev 1106,
1118-20 (1992), reviewing Glendon, Rights Talk (cited in note 54). For a slightly more nu-
anced treatment of this question, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 Phil
& Pub Aff 45, 60-61 (1971). Thomson suggests that when one refuses to give another what
the latter has no "right" to, the former is "callous," but is not acting "unjustly." Perhaps
Thomson means only to equate "justice" with the proper respect for the rights of others.
Her analysis sidesteps but does not necessarily exclude the possibility that one might
have a responsibility to give even things to which others have no right.
' See Robert Wuthnow, Acts of Compassion: Caring for Others and Helping Ourselves
18 (Princeton, 1990) (characterizing the 1970s as the "me generation," and the 1980s as
the "decade of greed").
' See, for example, Maijorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive
Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 Mich L Rev 465, 485-86 (1987); Gene
R. Nichol, Jr., Liberalism, Public Virtue, and JFK, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev 893, 894 (1989),
reviewing Theodore C. Sorenson, ed, 'Let the Word Go Forth: The Speeches, Statements,
and Writing of John F. Kennedy (Delacorte, 1988).
' Paradoxically, the government may simultaneously have been encouraging individ-
uals to abdicate responsibility for themselves. See Murray, Losing Ground (cited in note
31).
8 Indeed, at least some avowedly liberal theorists have been more willing than the
neo-republicans to focus on the responsible exercise of rights. See McClain, 43 Duke L J
at 998-1013 (cited in note 71).
' Sunstein, The Partial Constitution at 3-7 (cited in note 32).
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whether even those who have been victims in the past ought to
assume some responsibility for their future behavior."
This modern tendency to blame everyone but the individual
runs through the neo-republican literature. Evidence of the re-
publican refusal to hold individuals responsible can be as obvious
as Frank Michelman's insistence on a "right" to welfare92 -an
entitlement that asks nothing of the rights-bearer-or Cass
Sunstein's explicit condemnation of the concept of individual
responsibility as "blaming the victim."93 It can be as foundation-
al as Sunstein's suggestion that private preferences are socially
constructed rather than endogenous, 9' which in turn implies
that we should not hold the individual responsible for her own
choices. It can be as traditional to the political left as the doc-
trine of "false consciousness": surrogacy agreements are trou-
bling, according to Sunstein, because "notwithstanding what the
woman may think before the fact, the process of selling reproduc-
tive capacities can be harmful for her."95 It can be as subtle as
the neo-republican writing on voting rights: although much of
that literature stresses the importance of full participa-
tion9-even to the point of proportional representation of minor-
itiesS--it never deals with the basic problem. that many people,
especially minorities, simply don't vote." The standard response
9 See, for example, Murray, Losing Ground at 234 (cited in note 31) ("People-all
people, black or white, rich or poor-may be unequally responsible for what has happened
to them in the past, but all are equally responsible for what they do next."). Or, as a
successful Asian academic noted, "Asians succeed in part because they don't waste time
complaining about discrimination but rather work extra hard in case outside forces are
holding them back." Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on
Campus 45 (Free Press, 1991), paraphrasing Chia-Wei Woo, former president of San
Francisco State University. See also Daniel Goldman, Probing School Success of Asian-
Americans, NY Times C1 (Sept 11, 1990).
' Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 Wash U L
Q 659. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv L Rev 7 (1969). It may be slightly unfair to hold
Michelman to what he wrote in 1969, well before the republican revival. But the 1979
piece is two years after his first foray into republicanism: Frank I. Michelman, Political
Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Govern-
ment Legitimacy, 53 Ind L J 145 (1977-78). See Daniel A. Farber, Richmond and Repub-
licanism, 41 U Fla L Rev 623, 623 & n 3 (1989).
' Sunstein, The Partial Constitution at 188 (cited in note 32). See also id at 189, call-
ing poverty a form of "intense social disability," which suggests that those in poverty are
neither responsible for their condition nor expected to function adequately despite it.
9" Id at 162-94; Sunstein, 53 U Chi L Rev at 1129 (cited in note 27).
9 Sunstein, The Partial Constitution at 287 (cited in note 32).
See, for example, Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitu-
tional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 U Fla L Rev 443, 485-90 (1989).
Sunstein, 97 Yale L J at 1585-89 (cited in note 19).
See, for example, Jaynes and Williams, A Common Destiny at 235 (cited in note
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to this problem is to propose majority-minority districts that are
more heavily minority than otherwise would be necessary to elect
minority candidates if minorities voted at the same rate as
whites.' Neo-republicans neither reject nor explicitly accept this
solution. A "responsible republican" approach would confront the
voter apathy directly as a failure of individual virtue and would
surely not excuse it by deliberately constructing districts that
benefit the very individuals who refuse to exercise their civic
responsibilities. The neo-republicans, then, are much like their
liberal colleagues in avoiding confrontation with individual irre-
sponsibility.10'
The neo-republican scholarship thus reflects a more general
trend away from the traditional assumption that all citizens,
regardless of their personal or economic resources, are responsi-
ble adults (or are under the care of responsible adults). 10' Un-
der the traditional assumption, it is the community's obligation
to provide individuals with "access either to adequately remuner-
ative occupations or directly to adequate levels of resources," but
"[t]he use individuals make of this access is not a matter of fur-
ther collective concern."0 2 An individual who irresponsibly
squanders her share of the resources "does not generate any
additional need claims that society is obliged to honor."' 3 The
new assumptions are that no one is responsible because everyone
is a victim of circumstances and that the only solution is a prolif-
eration of rights. Neo-republicans recognize quite clearly that we
have lost the idea of social responsibility, 4 but their inability
to separate individual entitlements from community obligations
81).
,9 See, for example, Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Ques-
tion of Single-Member Districts, 14 Cardozo L Rev 1135 (1993).
"® I hope my writing on republicanism is an exception to this generalization. See
Sherry, 72 Va L Rev at 600-01 (cited in note 20) (praising Justice O'Connor's willingness
to allow states to discriminate in order to reward individual virtue). Ackerman's earlier
work similarly suggests that he finds dialogue and deliberation to be a responsibility of
citizenship, see Ackerman, Social Justice at 70-80 (cited in note 20), but his virtuous
suggestion is ultimately undermined by his endorsement of liberal value-neutrality in
education. See text accompanying note 113.
101 The role of the family in a responsible republican polity is complex and largely be-
yond the scope of this Article. For one interesting view-although not explicitly labelled
republican-see Nisbet, Twilight of Authority at 252-60 (cited in note 43). I do discuss the
role of the family briefly where it is directly relevant to the question of education.
1" Mead, Beyond Entitlement at 185 (cited in note 65).
103 Id.
10 For this reason, much of the focus of the remainder of this Article will be on rein-
vigorating concepts of individual responsibility, which is most lacking from the current
republican literature.
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leads them to endorse a one-sided solution. Moreover, they will
be unable to give substance to their vision of a deliberative and
virtuous community until they begin to reintroduce the concept of
individual responsibility. Irresponsible citizens can neither delib-
erate rationally nor behave virtuously.
10 5
In some ways, the foregoing analysis leaves more questions
than it answers. It is all very well to suggest that any successful
republican approach must incorporate notions of individual re-
sponsibility, but we are still stuck with the citizenry that we
have. Others have suggested ways to move adult members of the
underclass-and perhaps all adult Americans-toward greater
responsibility."°6 In the remainder of this Article, I will focus in-
stead on our best hope for permanent change: the education of
children for responsible republican citizenship.
A focus on children is particularly appropriate in a discus-
sion of responsible republicanism. Not only are children future
citizens who need to be taught the habits of responsible citizen-
ship, they also are the ones who have suffered most from the loss
of both individual and community responsibility. In some fami-
lies, children suffer because of their parents' irresponsible behav-
ior;0 7 in others, they suffer because of the diminution of com-
munity responsibility for its youngest members and the conse-
quent devaluing of children-for example, when social norms
create almost irresolvable conflicts between work and
parenting.0
8
'o' The consequences of the general abdication of responsibility have been widely
noted and need not be reviewed here. See generally Edelman, Families in Peril at 23-29
(cited in note 81); Jaynes and Williams, A Common Destiny at 302-03, 335-37, 352-54,
528-29 (cited in note 81); Mickey Kaus, The End of Equality 109-20 (Basic Books, 1992);
Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey, America's Misunderstood Welfare State at 114-15 (cited in
note 64); Mead, Beyond Entitlement at 7-8 (cited in note 65); Murray, Losing Ground
(cited in note 31); Sleeper, The Closest of Strangers at 188-92 (cited in note 77); Greg J.
Duncan, Martha S. Hill, and Saul D. Hoffman, Welfare Dependence Within and Across
Generations, 239 Science 467, 468 (Jan 29, 1988); Robert Moffitt, Welfare Reform: An
Economist's Perspective, 11 Yale L & Policy Rev 126, 133 (1993).
" See, for example, Murray, Losing Ground (cited in note 31); Mead, Beyond Entitle-
ment at 10-17 (cited in note 65); Galston, Liberal Purposes at 241-89 (cited in note 21);
Kaus, The End of Equality at 121-35; James Q. Wilson, On Character 11-23 (American
Enterprise Institute, 1991).
107 See note 81.
1 See, for example, Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace,
32 Ariz L Rev 431, 446-51, 493-95 (1990); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender
Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace,
24 Harv CR-CL L Rev 79, 83-110 (1989); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 Vand L Rev 1183, 1220-26 (1989); Joan Williams,
Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 NYU L Rev 1559, 1594-1608
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Finally, focusing on education for citizenship provides natu-
ral limits to the demands that republican virtue can make on
rights-bearing individuals. My intent is to accommodate rights
and responsibilities, not to eliminate rights altogether. Under a
mixed regime of both rights and responsibilities, irresponsible
behavior is not always subject to regulation. Nevertheless, irre-
sponsible behavior that affects future generations presents the
clearest conflict between rights and responsibilities. Thus, the
need to balance rights and responsibilities is most compelling
and the choices are most stark in the context of educating future
citizens.
II. AN EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP
Almost everyone agrees that our schools are failing. Achieve-
ment is down, violence is up, and no amount of money seems to
insulate schools from these trends."9 Students-even college-
bound students-often cannot read, add, identify within a centu-
ry when the American Civil War occurred, or locate Canada on a
map. Among a group of seventy high school student leaders from
all over the country, only seven had even heard of the Federalist
Papers." Put simply, many students are neither equipped nor
inclined to participate as citizens.
(1991); Etzioni, The Spirit of Community at 70-73 (cited in note 81). For another account
of the undervaluation of children, see Myron Lieberman, Public Education: An Autopsy
25-29 (Harvard, 1993).
10 A striking illustration of the problem lies in the following comparison:
Top Problems in Public Schools, According to Teachers
1940 1992
Talking out of turn Drug abuse
Making noise Alcohol abuse
Cutting in line Pregnancy
Littering Suicide
Chewing gum Rape
Running in halls Robbery
Dress 'code infraction Assault
2 Cong Q Researcher 787, 797 (Sept 11, 1992). Despite the fact that this list may be
apocryphal, see Barry O'Neill, The History of a Hoax, NY Times Mag 46 (Mar 6, 1994), its
widespread acceptance suggests that it resonates with what most Americans believe is
wrong with elementary education.
For general discussions of the failure of our schools, see The National Commission
on Excellence in Education, A Nation At Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform 8-
11 (US GPO, 1983); Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools:
Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 Tex L Rev 777, 785-94 (1985).
... William J. Bennett, To Reclaim a Legacy: A Report on the Humanities in Higher
Education 21 (National Endowment for the Humanities, 1984).
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An education for republican citizenship must integrate the
various notions discussed in the preceding Sections. Specifically,
it must prepare children to become responsible and deliberative
citizens in a diverse republic of rights. To that end, children need
to learn three things:1 ' moral character, critical thinking, and
cultural literacy (that is, a knowledge of and attachment to their
own culture). Neither the need for these three things nor their
content is uncontroversial, of course. In this Part, I will define
and defend each item as part of an education for responsible
republican citizenship.
A. Cultural Literacy
Cultural literacy is perhaps the most controversial of my
three proposals for responsible republican education. In a purely
liberal state, where each individual defines her own vision of the
good life and then pursues it as best she can, imbuing children
with cultural literacy verges on the sacrilegious. The liberal credo
is that education should not "bias the choices of children toward
some disputed or controversial ways of life and away from oth-
ers.""' Bruce Ackerman eloquently describes the appropriately
neutral stance of education in a liberal state:
We have no right to look upon future citizens as if we were
master gardeners who can tell the difference between a
pernicious weed and a beautiful flower. A system of liberal
education provides children with a sense of the very differ-
ent lives that could be theirs-so that, as they approach
maturity, they have the cultural materials available to build
lives equal to their evolving conceptions of the good."'
m I consciously pass over the need to learn and teach basic skills-which now must
include computer literacy as well as the traditional "three Rs"-since it is uncontroversial,
and the methods by which those skills may best be taught is beyond the scope of this
Article. One reason that basic skills education is uncontroversial may be that it is neces-
sary to prepare children to become self-sufficient and economically productive individuals,
regardless of how citizenship is defined or whether particular children are or will become
citizens. See Gerald L. Neuman, Rhetorical Slavery, Rhetorical Citizenship, 90 Mich L Rev
1276, 1285-87 (1992). However, it is important to note as well that the responsibilities of
citizenship can include being self-sufficient and economically productive citizens and that
basic skills are also a prerequisite to the critical thinking I advocate in the text.
1 Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education 34 (Princeton, 1987) (describing the liberal
state, but not advocating it).
11 Ackerman, Social Justice at 139 (cited in note 20). Ackerman, like many others,
tries to reconcile this with a parental or community "right to try to impress our children
with the things that are most important to us," id at 140, but he never explains how we
can do so without violating the liberal ethos of neutrality.
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Just as liberal politics must remain neutral among competing
visions of the good life, so must liberal education.
But educational neutrality is neither possible nor desirable.
Debates about how to structure a curriculum-any curricu-
lum-without inculcating values have filled the pages of law
reviews for over a decade, with no sign of a resolution."4 What-
ever we include in our curriculum; whatever we leave out; what-
ever comments teachers do or do not make about the materials;
whether we require children to sit in straight rows at their
desks, in a circle on the floor, or tell them to sit where they want,
we convey to children that convention and authority are behind a
particular value. The liberal values of neutrality, tolerance, and
rationality are themselves non-neutral: other value systems may
be based on believing in a "faith that is innocent of alternatives"
rather than adherence to particular views that are seen as "sub-
jective, contestable matters of opinion."" 5 It is simply not possi-
ble to eliminate values from education. As Miriam Galston has
noted, in recognizing that liberal curricula are not neutral, "The
question is not whether contemporary legal theory will tolerate
coercive or exclusionary doctrines and practices, but rather which
coercive or exclusionary doctrines and practices we as a nation
consider preferable.""'
None of this is new, and most commentators recognize that
deciding how much to inculcate values (and which ones) is a del-
icate exercise in line drawing: "Society must indoctrinate children
so they may be capable of autonomy. They must be socialized to
the norms of society while remaining free to modify or even aban-
don those norms.""7 Nevertheless, the visceral reaction against
value inculcation remains, and the result is that liberal education
writers tend to minimize reliance on substantive value inculca-
tion.
14 See, for example, Stephen Arons and Charles Lawrence, m, The Manipulation of
Consciousness: A First Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 Harv CR-CL L Rev 309
(1980); Tyll van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Governmental Authority to
Inculcate Youth, 62 Tex L Rev 197 (1983); Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship:
The Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 Yale L J
1647 (1986); Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Orthodoxy":
Value Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U Ill L Rev 15; Gregory Gelfand, Of Monkeys
and Men-An Atheist's Heretical View of the Constitutionality of Teaching the Disproof of
a Religion in the Public Schools, 16 J L & Educ 271 (1987); Stephen E. Gottlieb, In the
Name of Patriotism: The Constitutionality of "Bending" History in Public Secondary
Schools, 62 NYU L Rev 497 (1987).
115 Stolzenberg, 106 Harv L Rev at 587 n 26 (cited in note 27).
116 Galston, 82 Cal L Rev at 384 (cited in note 27).
117 Ingber, 1987 U Ill L Rev at 19 (cited in note 114).
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An educational program that is minimally value laden, in the
sense that the only values it inculcates are value-neutrality and
nonjudgmental tolerance of other visions of the good life, is dan-
gerous to republican citizenship, however. As Amy Gutmann, one
of the foremost modem philosophers of education, has pointed
out, "Treating every moral opinion as equally worthy encourages
children in the false subjectivism that 'I have my opinion and you
have yours and who's to say who's right?"' 8 Such a subjectivist
stance is incompatible with the republican ideal of responsible
citizenship: certain ways of behaving or believing are irresponsi-
ble and unvirtuous and ought to be discouraged or prohibited. An
educational philosophy that does not recognize such moral differ-
ences is not republican in any sense and cannot contribute to the
integration of the liberal and republican traditions.
But conceding that schools must and should inculcate values
only makes the issue more difficult, since the question remains:
whose values? Several writers have suggested that the choice of
values should be left almost entirely to the democratic pro-
cess."' That course is problematic for several reasons. First, of
course, there must be side constraints to prevent the majority
from denying children with different values the opportunity to
become productive adult citizens."n Such a constraint ultimate-
ly leads to a command to inculcate tolerance, which in turn re-
duces the amount of democratic control. Thus, the more sophisti-
cated proponents of democratic control recognize that educational
values cannot be chosen wholly by democratic processes. Since I
am not suggesting that no values should be chosen democratical-
ly-only that an educational scheme influenced by republicanism
does not favor democratic control ,as the primary strategy-we
... Gutmann, Democratic Education at 56 (cited in note 112). And for those who are
tempted to stick to their liberal guns and agree that all the opinions are equally worthy,
Gutmann offers the following cautionary illustration: "If children come to school believing
that 'blacks, Jews, Catholics, and/or homosexuals are inferior beings who shouldn't have
the same rights as the rest of us,' then it is criticism, not just clarification, of children's
values that is needed." Id.
" See, for example, id at 64. Gutmann does recognize two restraints on the majority's
control over the content of education: it must not operate so as to exclude any educable
children from ultimately becoming full citizens, and it must not prevent children from
learning to engage in critical thinking. See id at 44-45.
"o Gutmann adopts such a restraint, calling it the principle of nondiscrimination. Id
at 45. This denial of opportunity can take the form either of excluding the children from
an adequate education, or of imposing on them values that are both unnecessary to
republican citizenship and in conflict with their own cultural or familial values. I discuss
the interrelationship between national and familial cultural values at text accompanying
note 171.
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are then arguing simply over how much should be left to demo-
cratic control. One point of this Section is to show that a con-
straint of nondiscrimination (even when coupled with a require-
ment that children be given the ability to think critically and the
opportunity to develop moral character) is still insufficient to
produce truly virtuous republican citizens. Thus, just as individu-
al rights place a limit on majoritarian decision making in other
contexts, the goal of producing responsible republican citizens
ought to limit majority choices in education.
Another possibility is to make value inculcation a private
rather than a public matter, leaving the choice of values up to
individual parents. 1 There are, of course, serious practical ob-
stacles to implementing such a system. If, as I suggest, it cannot
be accomplished directly by making the schools value-neutral and
leaving all responsibility for value inculcation to the family, then
it must be accomplished indirectly by allocating more decisions
about school curricula to parents. This will likely lead to impasse
as parents in the same community fail to agree. Where they do
agree,' or where communities are able to support separate
schools (whether public or private) for separate value systems,
the resulting educational system will mirror the flaws of a pri-
marily democratic system. Again, I am not arguing that parents
should have no control over their children's education, but simply
that a reliance on parental choices in the first instance is unlike-
ly to produce responsible republican citizens.
One reason that leaving most educational choices to parents
or the democratic process is not likely to produce virtuous repub-
lican citizens is that this policy shares the same flaw that besets
the neo-republican reliance on process: it assumes, probably erro-
neously, that parents, whether individually or as a voting majori-
ty, will not make serious, virtue-threatening, education-stifling
121 The Supreme Court endorsed this view in Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 399
(1923), and Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 535 (1925). See Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm
& Mary L Rev 995 (1992), for an interesting discussion of this aspect of Meyer and Pierce.
See also Gutmann, Democratic Education at 28-33 (cited in note 112) (describing but not
espousing the view that parents should be able to make all educational choices for their
children).
12 For examples of parental communities that seem to agree, see Wisconsin v Yoder,
406 US 205, 209-12 (1972); Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v
Grumet, 114 S Ct 2481, 2485 (1994). See also Mozert v Hawkins County Board of Educa-
tion, 827 F2d 1058 (6th Cir 1987) (seven families, forming a potential community, agree-
ing on curriculum). As I discuss later, in each case the parental choice deprived the
children of an adequate education for citizenship.
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mistakes. That risk is especially acute in a diverse society, where
individual groups with local control over education might press
their own agendas to the detriment of a national education for
citizenship. Such balkanization will undermine both cultural
literacy-since each group of children will learn only a distorted
version of the common culture-and critical thinking-since no
group of parents will have any incentive to give children the tools
with which to question the received wisdom. Ackerman's descrip-
tion of the dangers of excess parental control over education is
apt here: it "legitimates a series of petty tyrannies in which like-
minded parents club together to force-feed their children without
restraint."23 Proponents of democratic control over the content
of education must either accept such a result or propose further
constraints. The latter solution will, I suggest, inevitably lead to
so many constraints as to approximate a substantive value sys-
tem. The former solution is really just a return to a form of liber-
al neutrality, as illustrated by William Galston's suggestion that
an unexamined life is also worth living.24 Not to a republican,
it's not. Or at least it is not in the public interest to educate
children to lead unexamined lives.
If we cannot avoid the issue by leaving the choice of values
to the democratic process, how can we choose such values? Here
is where both republican educative purposes and pragmatist
approaches can help. There are certain abilities, character traits,
and inclinations that are likely to be conducive to responsible
deliberation in a diverse republic of rights, and others that are
not. I leave for the next two Sections the question of abilities and
character traits and here focus on inclinations.
Republican virtue is not easy. Aristotle characterized the
virtues inherent in political participation as "natural" only in the
sense that they reflected humanity's highest nature. In fact,
attaining "natural" republican virtue takes work. 5 Whether
one relies on the aspirational language of John Adams, Frank
Michelman, or Bruce Ackerman, the effort required of republican
citizens is momentous. Adams suggested that "[mien must be
ready, they must pride themselves, and be happy to sacrifice
' Ackerman, Social Justice at 160 (cited in note 20). Ackerman is in fact talking
about voucher systems, although he does not adequately distinguish such systems from
our current system of allowing wealthy parents the same complete control. The problem is
more accurately described as allowing any group to control education by mere fiat (includ-
ing majority vote).
12 Galston, Liberal Purposes at 254 (cited in note 21).
m See Galston, 82 Cal L Rev at 345-54 (cited in note 27).
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their private pleasures, passions, and interests, nay, their private
friendships and dearest connections, when they stand in competi-
tion with the rights of society."126 Ackerman expects that during
the occasional few years of "constitutional politics," "[a]pathy will
give way to concern, ignorance to information, selfishness to seri-
ous reflection on the country's future."' Michelman asks us to
engage in "a process of personal self-revision under social-dialogic
stimulation." With all the competing demands on citizens'
time and energy, what will induce them to expend the effort
required for the responsible, rational deliberation of republican
citizenship?"
The best bet is an emotional attachment to the polity and
one's fellow citizens.30 Out of favor as it may be, this sort of at-
tachment encourages citizens to behave toward their country and
its citizens as they do toward their families: proud, protective,
and willing to make sacrifices. Such attachment is the "spiritual
cement [of] the political community." 3' Cultivating such an at-
tachment to one's nation depends in turn on both knowledge and
assimilation: to feel that she is an American, a child must learn
about America's cultural and political heritage and accept it as
her own. In other words, to produce American citizens we must
"' Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (Apr 16, 1776), in Adrienne Koch and
William Peden, eds, The Selected Writings of John and John Quincy Adams 57, 58 (Green-
wood, 1981).
127 Ackerman, We the People at 287-88 (cited in note 20).
' Michelnan, 97 Yale L J at 1528 (cited in note 21). See also id at 1504, quoting
Hanna Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9 Pol Theory 327, 344 (1981)
("Only in public life can we jointly, as a community, exercise the human capacity 'to think
what we are doing,' and take charge of the history in which we are all constantly engaged
by drift and inadvertance.").
' Most neo-republicans reject James Madison's solution of finessing the problem by
rigging the system so that the country will prosper even as most individual citizens focus
only on their own private concerns. (Cass Sunstein may be an exception to this general-
ization, but his reading of Madison is sui generis. See Robert W. Bennett, Of Gnarled Pegs
and Round Holes: Sunstein's Civic Republicanism and the American Constitution, 11
Const Commentary 395, 418-19 (1994), reviewing Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (cited
in note 32); John 0. McGinnis, The Partial Republican, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev 1751, 1776-
77 n 90 (1994), reviewing Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (cited in note 32).) The prem-
ise of the whole neo-republican movement is that Madison's solution has not been very
successful.
1" One author has called the dual commitment to one's community and members of
that community a "social duty." Heyman, 47 Vand L Rev at 680 (cited in note 84). As I
discuss later, citizens also need sufficient moral character to motivate them to fulfill their
emotional commitment to their community. See Part II.C.
131 See Nisbet, Twilight of Authority at 64 (cited in note 43).
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cultivate an American "civic identity.""2 A shared cultural iden-
tity makes possible "a shared future" and "forge[s] a nation.""
Advocating this type of cultural literacy is not merely contro-
versial; it is also in stark conflict with what is actually taught in
our schools. One newspaper reporter, documenting and lamenting
American children's appalling ignorance of their own country,
concluded that "[the kids I saw.., are not mentally prepared to
continue the society because they basically do not understand the
society well enough to value it."'34 The high school and college
students he talked to did not know that Nevada and Oregon have
the same number of senators as California (and only some knew
how many that was); could not date the Civil War, World War I,
or World War II; could not locate Chicago, Washington, D.C., or
Toronto on a map; and could not identify Thomas Jefferson or
give the year of the Declaration of Independence." 5 Other re-
ports convey a similarly dismal picture: we are not educating our
children to be culturally literate.
Especially in a society as ethnically and religiously diverse
as our own, a common culture is crucial to republican citizenship.
First, of course, the common culture serves as the background
against which rational deliberation can take place. Moreover,
part of the American common culture is the act of assimilation
itself: as many commentators, from Crbvecoeur to Frankfurter,
have recognized, the immigrant and multi-ethnic nature of Amer-
ica means that the choice to be an American is a large part of the
glue that holds our society together.3 ' While this does not nec-
essarily entail abandoning one's original ethnic culture, it does
require an emotional allegiance to the new, common culture.
Otherwise, as Richard Rodriguez has noted, Americanization can
1 See Weiser, 68 NYU L Rev at 949-52 (cited in note 24). See also Christopher L.
Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 NYU L Rev 961, 968-81
(1992) (using appeals to a shared identity to teach).
13 Rodriguez, Days of Obligation at 163 (cited in note 70).
Benjamin J. Stein, The Cheerful Ignorance of the Young in L.A, Wash Post A15
(Oct 3, 1983).
1"3 Id. See also examples gathered in D'Souza, Illiberal Education at 1415 (cited in
note 91).
"' For Crovecoeur's classic statement, see Hector St. John de Crbvecoeur, Letters
From an American Farmer 69-70 (Penguin, 1981) (originally published in 1792). For one
illustration of Frankfurter's views, see Sanford Levinson, Constituting Communities
Through Words That Bind: Reflections on Loyalty Oaths, 84 Mich L Rev 1440, 1440-41
(1986). See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Paths To Belonging: The Constitution and Cultur-
al Identity, 64 NC L Rev 303, 363-65 (1986) (without common ancestry or religion, what
holds Americans together is belief in the "American civic culture"); id at 312-13 (includes
a cautionary tale of how assimilationism can be distorted into "racist nativism").
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only be described "as loss": "America is the country where one
stops being Italian or Chinese or German." 7 As I will suggest
below, the two cultures can coexist. Learning about a common
culture is also important as a prerequisite to the critical delibera-
tion of republican citizens: "mastering [ ] other people's reflection"
is necessary "to give access and context to original inquiry."138
In particular, our own cultural tradition ought to be given
what James Boyd White calls presumptive authority: we "should
meditate long before exercising [critical judgment] against the
texts that have behind them the authority of our tradition,"39
lest we succumb to the vanity of believing that we now stand at
the pinnacle of cultural progress. Or, as Anthony Kronman has
so eloquently put it, we must reach a new "understanding [of]
what has, for us, become so nearly unintelligible: the inherent
authority of the past and the directness of the claim it has upon
us."
140
Of course, as I will suggest in the next Section, neither
should we unquestioningly accept our tradition as binding. As
Rebecca Brown points out, too strong an emphasis on tradition
"overlooks (or undervalues) another equally essential attribute of
humanity: the capacity of discernment and judgment," and risks
the complacency of believing that "where we have been is where
we want to be."' Nevertheless, a prudent regard for tradition
favors incremental over radical change. A presumption in fa-
vor of tradition, mediated by reason, is consistent with both the
"s Rodriguez, Days of Obligation at 164 (cited in note 70).
's Eva T.H. Brann, Paradoxes of Education in a Republic 16-17 (Chicago, 1979). See
also Nisbet, Twilight of Authority at 116 (cited in note 43) ("Genuinely creative
work.., never cuts itself off from tradition.").
"9 James Boyd White, Introduction: Is Cultural Criticism Possible?, 84 Mich L Rev
1373, 1382 (1986).
140 Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 Yale L J 1029, 1048 (1990).
Kronman follows the tradition of Edmund Burke and Alexander Bickel. See also Anthony
T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 Yale L J 1567, 1575-79 (1985).
.41 Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 Yale L J 177, 213, 204 (1993).
" See Kronman, 94 Yale L J at 1602-10. At least one commentator has identified
Bruce Ackerman as a Burkean, insofar as both Ackerman's and Burke's theories are
"evolutionary, historicist theories of political development." Eben Moglen, The Incompleat
Burkean: Bruce Ackerman's Foundation for Constitutional History, 5 Yale J L & Humani-
ties 531, 548 (1993), reviewing Ackerman, We the People (cited in note 20). Since at least
one commentator has also identified Ackerman as a republican, see Feldman, 81
Georgetown L J at 2243 n 3 (cited in note 20), the connection between republicanism and
Burkeanism-for which I argue in this Article-is at least arguably made by Bruce
Ackerman (as interpreted by his commentators). However, Ackerman in general suffers
from the problems I identified in Part I; moreover, it is not clear whether he views himself
as either a republican or a Burkean (he pretty clearly denies the latter).
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republican and the pragmatist focuses of this Article. For deliber-
ative republicanism, a common tradition must be one of the foun-
dations of common citizenship. Pragmatists similarly value tradi-
tion as "the essential foundation for intellectual and social prog-
ress."
43
Finally, a common culture is most important in our diverse
society as a means of maintaining connections among citizens
and between citizens and the polity. In an America that consists
of separate and individual cultures with no common bond, citi-
zens will have no reason to act on behalf of either the common
good or members of other groups.'" We need only look to the
former Yugoslavia to see the ultimate consequences of a failure of
common culture. Domestic examples of the negative consequences
of abandoning a common culture in favor of a multiplicity of
individual cultures also abound, 45 but one of the more telling
may be found within the confines of the legal profession. No re-
publican revival is possible where ethnic identity so defines indi-
viduals that one well-respected law professor can summarize the
work of two others by saying that, because of their race, "they
both are members of the oppressor class."46 If the cream of the
legal profession, traditionally among the keepers and conveyors
of the common culture,47 has become so balkanized, what hope
is there for the rest of society?
To many proponents of the new multiculturalism, both the
existence of a common culture and the assimilationist ideal I
have just described are heresy. The standard charge is that our
"common culture" is in fact a Eurocentric one and that the
' Farber, 72 Minn L Rev at 1344 (cited in note 44).
14 Diane Ravitch makes the latter point in Multiculturalism: E Pluribus Plures, 59
Am Scholar 337, 353 (1990).
" For some examples in academia, see D'Souza, Illiberal Education at 2-12, 46-48,
124-25 (cited in note 91). See also Sleeper, The Closest of Strangers at 172 (cited in note
77), describing an affirmative action manual distributed to some New York state employ-
ees in 1987 that read in part: "All White individuals in our society are racist. Even if a
White is totally free of all conscious racial prejudice, he remains a racist, for he receives
benefits distributed by a White racist society through its institutions."
14 Derrick Bell and Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97
Yale L J 1609, 1620 (1988). A related example is the attempt to intimidate and silence
Randall Kennedy, a black scholar who dared to question the received wisdom of cultural
separatism. See Charles Rothfeld, Minority Critic Stirs Debate on Minority Writing, NY
Times B6 (Jan 5, 1990).
17 See, for example, Glendon, Rights Talk at 87 (cited in note 54); Robert Ferguson,
Law and Letters in American Culture 273-90 (Harvard, 1984); Larry Alexander, What We
Do, and Why We Do It, 45 Stan L Rev 1885, 1902 (1993).
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assimilationist approach simply imposes it on all of the other
cultures present in the American population.
As a matter of history, there is some truth to the charge of
Eurocentrism. For many years, textbooks of American history
and culture ignored the experiences and contributions of non-
European Americans (and nonmale Americans, as well).' Even
as recently as 1987, E.D. Hirsch's recipe for "cultural literacy"
was disproportionately skewed toward European and classical
cultures.' 9 The multicultural movement toward broader inclu-
sion-and toward the recognition that, as Patricia Williams puts
it, "people of color have always been part of Western Civiliza-
tion"'5 -- is a much-needed correction. To the extent that
multiculturalism is inclusive in this way, it is not only compati-
ble with a responsible republican education, it is also necessary if
republicanism is to survive in an ethnically diverse and demo-
cratic society.' 5 1 The common culture that should be taught in
our schools is a diverse and multi-ethnic one:
Although our nation does include many diverse cultures, we
are not simply a collection of diverse cultures. We are bound
together as a people by a common commitment to the politi-
cal ideas and values contained in the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights and elaborated by those (like Thomas Jeffer-
son, Abraham Lincoln, and Martin Luther King, Jr.) who
have extended and articulated the definition of our civic
culture in each generation.... [Olur national heritage is
larger than its Anglo-Saxon roots. It has been shaped, en-
riched, redefined, and transformed by many others who do
not trace their ancestry to England.'52
As Richard Rodriguez has emphasized: "To argue for a common
culture is not to propose an exclusionary culture or a static cul-
ture. The classroom is always adding to the common text, be-
14 See Henry Louis Gates, Loose Canons: Notes On the Culture Wars 108-11 (Oxford,
1992); Ravitch, 59 Am Scholar at 338 (cited in note 144).
19 E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know
(Houghton Mifflin, 1987). For critiques of Hirsch as Eurocentric, see, for example, Rick
Simonson and Scott Walker, Multicultural Literacy (Graywolf, 1988).
" Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Oppor-
tunity, 87 Mich L Rev 2128, 2136 (1989).
... The historical version of republicanism did not need to confront this particular
problem. Eighteenth-century American society was both less diverse and less democratic;
those who were not part of the "official" culture simply did not count as republican citi-
zens.
" Diane Ravitch, A Response to Auster, 4 Academic Questions 85, 86 (Fall 1991).
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cause America is a dynamic society."5 ' It is also an imperfect
society. Thus, we must also teach, as Diane Ravitch has pointed
out, "a warts-and-all history"'54 to show children that their own
culture (whether common or individual) is far from perfect.
But some multiculturalists go much further than demanding
inclusion or an accurate, multi-ethnic description of the common
culture. Ravitch distinguishes between pluralistic multicultural-
ism, which seeks inclusion, and particularistic multiculturalism,
which "insist[s] that no common culture is possible or desirable"
and promotes ethnocentric curricula that stress differences
among the various cultures.'55 I find the particularists' claims
incomprehensible and the consequences dangerous.
The claim that there is no common culture is a version of the
broader philosophical claim-sometimes made by the same indi-
viduals-that truth is subjective and reality constructed.55 As I
argued earlier, this type of relativism creates an impassable
obstacle for those neo-republicans who cling to it despite its in-
consistency with the rest of republican thought. It is also incoher-
ent in the context of debates about cultural education. As many
others have noted about analogous indeterminacy theories, cul-
tural relativism leaves its adherents defenseless against charges
that their own cultural views are just as contingent and indefen-
sible as any others. There is no way to say whether an
Afrocentric or Eurocentric curriculum is better, truer, or more
valid, and the debate will quickly degenerate into a futile cacoph-
ony of conflicting claims.'57
iu Rodriguez, Days of Obligation at 170 (cited in note 70).
Ravitch, 59 Am Scholar at 340 (cited in note 144).
Id at 340-41. Henry Louis Gates draws a similar distinction. See Gates, Loose
Canons at 176-78 (cited in note 148). See also Rockefeller, Comment (cited in note 42).
There is a related phenomenon in higher-education hiring these days. Proponents of
"diversity" are no longer satisfied with having people of color on university faculties: "the
ends of diversity are not served by persons who look black and think White." Ian Haney-
Lopez, Community Ties, Race, and Faculty Hiring: The Case for Professors Who Don't
Think White, 1 Reconstruction 46, 49 (No 3, 1991), quoting Derrick Bell. For a biting cri-
tique of this mentality, see Paul D. Carrington, Diversity!, 1992 Utah L Rev 1105, 1110-
14.
1w For a description and critique of this version of social constructivism, see Amy
Gutmann, Introduction, in Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recogni-
tion" 3, 18-19 (Princeton, 1992). For a critique of one form of social contructivism cur-
rently popular among legal academics, see Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry,
"Posner's List": An Essay on Merit, Social Constructivism, and Anti-Semitism, 83 Cal L
Rev (forthcoming May 1995).
"" For a matched set of such claims, compare the polemics of Professors Leonard
Jeffries and Michael Levin, both at City University of New York. For a brief review of
their hate-filled claims, see Maria Newman, CUNY Violated Speech Rights of Department
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To respond, as particularists are likely to do, that neither
curriculum is better in the abstract but that African-American
children should be given an Afrocentric curriculum is to highlight
the dangers inherent in the particularist approach. Even if it
were possible for every child to be given a curriculum tailored to
her own ethnic (or religious) ancestry, such a course would en-
danger the welfare of both the community and the child. Where
citizens' education has differed so fundamentally and so wide-
ly,158 a republican community is impossible and a liberal state
unlikely. Some common ground is necessary to maintain the
tolerance, respect for justice, and law abidance that keep the
liberal state from degenerating into a war of all against all. As
one scholar suggests in a slightly different context, "We can live
together in deep disagreement about abortion, but not if we also
disagree about the propriety of using force on our opponents."
159
In the specific context of education, the National Commission on
Excellence in Education concluded that "[a] high level of shared
education is essential to a free, democratic society and to the
fostering of a common culture, especially in a country that prides
itself on pluralism and individual freedom."60
The other problem with curricula tailored to a child's ethnici-
ty is that it prevents the child from developing her own potential.
Ravitch describes the limiting message conveyed by an
ethnocentric curriculum:
It teaches children that their identity is determined by their
"cultural genes." That something in their blood or their race
memory or their cultural DNA defines who they are and
what they may achieve. That the culture in which they live
is not their own culture, even though they were born here.
That American culture is "Eurocentric," and therefore hostile
to anyone whose ancestors are not European. Perhaps the
most invidious implication of particularism is that racial and
ethnic minorities are not and should not try to be part of
Chief, Jury Says, NY Times Al (May 12, 1993).
" Many of the proposals for various ethnocentric curricula are fundamentally dif-
ferent from any curriculum we have seen or imagined. See Ravitch, 59 Am Scholar at 344-
48 (cited in note 144); Arthur Schlesinger, The Disuniting of America 73-99 (Norton,
1991).
59 John Gray, Toleration: And the Currently Offensive Implication of Judgement, in
Digby Anderson, ed, The Loss of Virtue: Moral Confusion and Social Disorder in Britain
and America 33, 40 (Social Affairs Unit, 1992).
" The National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk at 7 (cited
in note 109).
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American culture; it implies that American culture belongs
only to those who are white and European; it implies that
those who are neither white nor European are alienated
from American culture by virtue of their race or ethnicity; it
implies that the only culture they do belong to or can ever
belong to is the culture of their ancestors, even if their faro-
flies have lived in this country for generations.''
This message is clearly not valid. As W.E.B. Du Bois eloquently
pointed out, literature knows no color: "I sit with Shakespeare,
and he winces not. Across the color line I move arm in arm with
Balzac and Dumas.... I summon Aristotle and Aurelius and
what soul I will, and they come all graciously with no scorn nor
condescension. "
162
Moreover, studies suggest that black achievement on intelli-
gence tests-which correlates with economic and social suc-
cess-is "directly related to greater proximity to a white middle-
class cultural standard."'63 Depriving black children of the
norms and knowledge of the culture in which they will live thus
condemns them to a life of marginality and segregation. Arthur
Schlesinger has aptly summarized the overall effect of
Afrocentrism: "If some Kleagle of the Ku Klux Klan wanted to
devise an educational curriculum for the specific purpose of hand-
icapping and disabling black Americans, he would not be likely to
come up with anything more diabolically effective than
Afrocentrism.""' The racial polarization that develops from
racial politics in education is not good for blacks or whites. As
Cornel West notes, "[Als long as racial reasoning regulates black
thought and action, Clarence Thomases will continue to haunt
black America-as Bush and other conservatives sit back, watch,
and prosper."'65
Finally, by suggesting that the purpose of education is "to
instill in children a pride in their ancestral pasts," particularist
161 Ravitch, 59 Am Scholar at 341 (cited in note 144).
Gates, Loose Canons at 111 (cited in note 148), quoting W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls
of Black Folk (McClurg, 1904). See also Gates, Loose Canons at 21 (cited in note 148), de-
scribing Gates's own love of literature as stemming from early exposure to Dickens,
Austen, Hugo, and de Maupassant, in addition to James Baldwin.
" Jaynes and Williams, A Common Destiny at 370 (cited in note 81). See also
Signithia Fordham, Racelessness as a Factor in Black Students' School Success: Pragmatic
Strategy or Pyrrhic Victory?, 58 Harv Educ Rev 54, 80 (1988).
16 Schlesinger, The Disuniting of America at 94 (cited in note 158).
Cornel West, Race Matters 25 (Beacon, 1993).
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multiculturalism is "condescending," as Richard Rodriguez recog-
nizes:
Did anyone attempt to protect the white middle-class stu-
dent of yore from the ironies of history? Thomas Jeffer-
son-that great democrat-was also a slaveowner. Need we
protect black students from complexity? Thomas Jefferson,
that slaveowner, was also a democrat. American history has
become a pageant of exemplary slaves and black educators.
Gay studies, women's studies, ethnic studies-the new cur-
riculum ensures that education will be flattering. But I sub-
mit that America is not a tale for sentimentalists.66
At bottom, then, particularist multiculturalism is a political,
not an educational, strategy. As Charles Taylor perceptively
notes, it is one thing to expect that the intellectual products of all
cultures be equally considered for inclusion in the canon; it is
quite another to demand that they be equally included, regard-
less of their actual worth.'67 I have suggested that the first
claim serves both educational and political goals: treating all
cultures with equal respect-presuming that they have much to
offer us-is likely to further the education of all children and to
increase the political and economic power of previously excluded
cultures. But the latter claim is, as Taylor recognizes, a demand
that "we come up with a final concluding judgment that their
[actual] value is great."68 Such a claim is not only poor educa-
tional policy, it is, in Taylor's view, "nonsense."69
My call for cultural literacy, in the form of both knowledge
and assimilation, does not entail either mindless exercises of
obeisance-such as daily flag salutes--or the sacrifice of ethnic or
religious identity. As one scholar notes, we need both a "common
bond as citizens of the United States and ... differing identities
as members of specific ethnic and religious groups."'70 Assimila-
tion need not mean annihilation: one can simultaneously value
both commonalities with the larger society and the differences
that make each subculture unique.
1 Rodriguez, Days of Obligation at 169 (cited in note 70).
16 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition" 42-43, 65-71
(Princeton, 1992).
1 8 Id at 69.
9 Id at 70.
170 James Nickel, Equal Opportunity in a Pluralistic Society, 5 Soc Phil & Policy 104,
109 (1987).
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Neither the state nor parents should have a monopoly on
socializing the next generation. Recognizing that children belong
to both the larger American culture and smaller subcultures
allows parents and schools each a role in inculcating values.
Families can, and do, promote the values of their own subculture,
but "schools exist to teach children the general skills and
knowledge that they need to succeed in American society, and the
specific skills and knowledge that they need in order to function
as American citizens."'7 ' It is only where parental (or subcul-
ture) values might undermine a child's opportunity to become a
functioning, participating, republican citizen that a conflict
arises. My proposal of education for republican citizenship affords
a justification for resolving that particular conflict in favor of the
state.
Even the question of identifying the basic aspects of the
common culture that should be passed on to the young turns out
to be fairly simple: they are the same abilities, inclinations, and
character traits that prepare children for a future as republican
citizens. No culture has a monopoly on hard work, honesty, care-
ful thought, individual responsibility, treating others with respect
and tolerance, or expecting that others will follow the same pre-
cepts. All are part of the American creed, however, in part be-
cause they have been so successful in producing a vibrant, pro-
ductive, wealthy, multicultural nation. To suggest that deviance
from these norms is simply part of a subculture that deserves our
equal respect, or that these norms are Eurocentric and should be
rejected, is either to deny the power of contemporary and histori-
cal observation or to retreat into a relativism that approaches ni-
hilism. Neither response is consistent with the kind of pragma-
tist approach to a republican vision that I am advocating here;
both are exaggerated forms of the distorted individualist rights
mentality that has grown out of modern liberalism set loose from
republican responsibility.
In summary, a responsible republican education would give
children both the knowledge and the inclination to act in accor-
dance with the common culture. That culture would be depicted
as broadly inclusive but not infinitely forgiving. It is a culture of
expectations and responsibilities as well as rights and tolerance.
Most important, these cultural norms should be inculcated in the
child so that she takes them as her own and resists changing
171 Ravitch, 59 Am Scholar at 351 (cited in note 144). See also Ravitch, 4 Academic
Questions at 87 (cited in note 152).
1995]
The University of Chicago Law Review
them. As Martha Nussbaum paraphrases Aristotle: "change
should not be too easy."
172
B. Critical Thinking
An education that merely inculcated cultural norms might be
suitable for a totalitarian state, where the citizen's major respon-
sibility is to conform. But in a diverse republic, where citizenship
consists in rational deliberation and dialogue about the good life
for individuals and the nation as a whole, and where citizens dis-
agree about both, cultural literacy is not enough. Mature citizens
must "develop a certain degree of autonomy and capacity for
independent judgment while still appreciating the value to be
gained from the widsom and experiences of prior genera-
tions."73 Thus, as Amy Gutmann puts it, "Children must learn
not just to behave in accordance with authority but to think criti-
cally about authority if they are to live up to the democratic ideal
of sharing political sovereignty as citizens." 74 Similarly, Bruce
Ackerman suggests that parents have an obligation to provide
their children "with cultural equipment that permits the child to
criticize, as well as affirm, parental ideals."75 Republican citi-
zens need both the common background provided by an education
in cultural literacy and the ability to "deliberate critically among
a range of good lives and good societies."76 Without the ability
to think critically, citizens can do nothing but accept social norms
as authoritative. Republican deliberation will be impossible be-
cause there will be neither the capacity to deliberate nor any-
thing about which to deliberate.
Recognizing that citizens must be equipped to choose among
different visions of the good life and the good society does not
172 Nussbaum, NY Rev of Books at 36 (cited in note 48).
173 Brown, 103 Yale L J at 180 (cited in note 141). See also id at 212, quoting Imman-
uel KantAn Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?, in Hans Reiss, ed, Kant's Po-
litical Writings 54 (University Press, 1970) (H.B. Nisbet, trans) ("Immaturity is the in-
ability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another."); Feldman, 81
Georgetown L J at 2278 (cited in note 20).
17 Gutmann, Democratic Education at 51 (cited in note 112). Like the neo-republican
legal scholars, Gutmann believes that virtue in our modem democracy consists in "the
ability to deliberate, and hence to participate in conscious social reproduction." Id at 46.
Gutmann acknowledges that she is following John Dewey in recommending an education
in critical thought as vital to democracy. Id at 13. Other proponents of a critical education
similarly credit Dewey. See, for example, Putnam, 63 S Cal L Rev at 1696-97 (cited in
note 2).
1 Ackerman, Social Justice at 117 (cited in note 20).
16 Gutmann, Democratic Education at 44 (cited in note 112).
[62:131
Responsible Republicanism
entail a return to the relativism of liberal neutrality. The key to
a republican education that avoids authoritarianism is the desir-
ability of instilling some predispositions toward particular visions
of the good. Gutmann's scheme does this by permitting the demo-
cratic process to determine the content of the curriculum (subject
to two constraints designed to guarantee both inclusiveness and
training in critical thought), thus ensuring that a majority of
families can reproduce their own values to some extent.'77 For
reasons already discussed, I do not believe that leaving educa-
tional value choices to the democratic process is likely to produce
republican citizens; my explorations of cultural literacy and mor-
al character try to specify more directly the values that ought to
be instilled. Under either method of making educational value
choices, however, the basic tenet of liberalism-that there are a
multiplicity of good lives-is tempered by an insistence that citi-
zens in a particular society be predisposed to choose one of the
good lives valued by and valuable to their own society, rather
than cast adrift to choose indiscriminately from an infinite num-
ber of possible lives.
Conversely, the liberal notion that there are diverse forms of
human flourishing informs responsible republican education in
two ways. First, it allows for a pluralist multicultural approach
to education, as suggested in the previous Section. Second, it
demonstrates the need for critical thinking in either a liberal or
republican regime. Critical or rational thinking, moreover, is a
basic tenet of pragmatism as well. Dewey championed rationality
and the scientific method as "the method of intelligence itself in
action."7 ' Pragmatist approaches, like the responsible republi-
canism I am advocating, depend on an interaction between tradi-
tion and critical, rational thought.
Like cultural literacy, however, an emphasis on critical
thinking is neither uncontroversial nor in accord with what is
generally taught in American elementary and secondary schools.
In Amherst, Massachusetts, a relatively wealthy center of higher
education with a respected and progressive public school system,
the "predominant values" of the public schools are, according to
one writer, nevertheless "conformity, anti-intellectualism, passivi-
ty, alienation, classism, and hierarchy."79 Amherst is far from
17 Id at 64-65.
177 John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action 46-47 (Capricorn, 1963). See also
Margaret Jane Radin, A Deweyan Perspective on the Economic Theory of Democracy, 11
Const Commentary (forthcoming Dec 1994).
17' Stephen Arons, Compelling Belief The Culture of American Schooling 78 (McGraw
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unique. The proliferation of courses that are designed to be "rele-
vant" and to build students' self-esteem has necessarily dimin-
ished the ability of schools to teach rigorous courses requiring
critical thought.80 Textbooks, and therefore courses, are often
sanitized to avoid controversy, but consequently deprive students
of role models or material for critical thought.'8 '
Republicans are not alone in recognizing the need for critical
capacity. Stephen Macedo, for example, suggests that liberal
virtues include "developing the self-conscious, self-critical, reflec-
tive capacities that allow one to formulate, evaluate, and revise
ideals of life and character, to bring these evaluations to bear on
actual choices and on the formulation of projects and commit-
ments."'82 In light of the liberal emphasis on individual choice
and governmental neutrality, it is not surprising that a liberal
education includes cultivating the ability to make deliberative,
reasoned choices through critical thinking. But the liberal con-
sensus on the need for a critical education masks the fact that
critical thinking is, like cultural literacy, educationally controver-
sial.
In particular, the staunchest opponents of an education in
critical thinking are certain religious fundamentalists who wish
their children to remain unexposed to the skepticism of critical
rational thought. As one sympathetic observer notes, the dis-
agreement between such fundamentalist parents and more tradi-
tional school boards is "over whether to consider the cultivation
of individual reason, objective judgment and rational, critical
thought.., as a form of indoctrination."'83 Those who believe
that truth lies in faith rather than in reason find an education in
critical thought offensive to their basic belief systems. One such
parent testified that, "she did not want her children to make
critical judgments and exercise choices in the areas where the
Bible provides the answer."" In fundamentalist schools, "[ilf
some matter falls within the scriptural domain of truth, it is
Hill, 1983).
1" See, for example, James S. Coleman, Thomas Hoffer, and Sally Kilgore, High
School Achievement: Public, Catholic, and Private Schools Compared 193 (Basic Books,
1982). See generally Dennis O'Keeffe, Diligence Abandoned. The Dismissal of Traditional
Virtues in the School, in Digby Anderson, ed, The Loss of Virtue: Moral Confusion and
Social Disorder in Britain and America 181 (Social Affairs Unit, 1992).
'l Gottlieb, 62 NYU L Rev at 504-12 (cited in note 114); Toni Massaro, Constitutional
Literacy 134 (Duke, 1994).
1 Stephen Macedo, Charting Liberal Virtues, 34 Nomos 204, 217 (1992).
18 Stolzenberg, 106 Harv L Rev at 611 (cited in note 27).
18 Mozert v Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F2d 1058, 1069 (6th Cir 1987).
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incumbent upon teachers to present that matter as
uncontestably, unequivocally tru..... What is deemed to be
true... will never be taught as though it might be open to ques-
tion.""5 It is not only the religious right that opposes an educa-
tion that will equip children to question the beliefs of their par-
ents; some of the more extreme multicultural particularists seem
to advocate a similar blind faith. 8 6
The liberal tradition, because of its emphasis on government
neutrality, individual rights, and multiple visions of the good life,
cannot resolve the kind of conflict that arises between those who
trust in faith and those who trust in reason.8 7 Only a tradition
that endorses particular substantive values, rather than advocat-
ing neutrality among values, can coherently argue that rationali-
ty and critical thinking are virtues. And, as I have suggested,
rationality and critical thinking are virtues in a republican polity,
as prerequisites for both reasoned deliberation and individual
and social choice. A responsible republican approach can easily
reject the fundamentalist challenge by suggesting that children
educated not to question authority (whether biblical or other) are
unlikely to be able to engage in the sort of reasoned dialogue
crucial in a diverse democracy. Hence, they will never become
citizens who can fully participate in republican dialogue and
deliberation. Republicanism can thus offer a more satisfying
justification for an insistence that citizens be educated in critical
thinking. But, as the next Section suggests, neither cultural liter-
acy nor critical thinking is sufficient to produce responsible re-
publican citizens.
" Alan Peshkin, God's Choice: The Total World of a Fundamentalist Christian School
59 (Chicago, 1986).
" The best-and most sympathetic-article on the antirational, antiliberal aspects of
the fundamentalist educational battles recognizes the analogies between fundamentalists
and multiculturalists in this context. Stolzenberg, 106 Harv L Rev at 666 & n 433 (cited
in note 27).
'87 See id at 655-57. Stolzenberg argues that republicanism also values rationality and
is thus similarly unable to resolve the conflict. Id at 641-46, 651-60. This is true of the
neo-republicanism she describes. My argument that neo-republicans are caught in a par-
adox because they endorse both ethical relativism and governmental value choices, see
text accompanying notes 27-43, echoes her suggestion that "both civic republicanism and
liberalism are torn between a disinclination to judge or to undermine diverse ways of life
and the conflicting assumption of an objective-critical perspective that brackets the truth
question and renders 'belief-systems' as subjective, historical data." Id at 660. The modi-
fied republicanism I am advocating in this Article, however, values both assimilation and
rationality independently as substantive goods and therefore has no problem resolving the
conflict between faith and reason. Although there may be reasons to allow those who
reject reason to do so, a basic education for citizenship must give children the tools with
which to choose as adults.
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C. Moral Character
Both cultural literacy and rational thinking are, in a sense,
forms of knowledge. "But to know is not good enough. Even given
full knowledge, it remains to act virtuously. As with the good,
virtue has to do with action."'88 Republicanism will not succeed
even with citizens who are capable of acting virtuously if they are
not also inclined to do so. As one writer perceptively notes, an
education that "chiefly tends to shape the habits of the mind" is
"an incomplete education," for we also need to "shape the habits
of the heart."'89 Thus, education must instill good moral charac-
ter in children.
The most basic moral requirement of republican citizens, of
course, is an inclination to participate in their republic, to engage
in rational deliberation. I can give no better description of this
type of moral character required of republican citizens than
Gutmann's: Citizens must be "morally serious people... [who]
can be trusted to defend and to respect laws that are not in their
self-interest, at the same time as they can be expected to oppose
laws that violate democratic principles." 90 Thus, the sort of de-
liberation engaged in by republican citizens of good character
distinguishes them from "both sophists, who use clever argument
to elevate their own interests into self-righteous causes, and
traditionalists, who invoke established authority to subordinate
their own reason to unjust causes."' For Gutmann, moral
character is the inclination to engage in moral reasoning (or, in a
more neo-republican dialect, reasoned deliberation).
I would go further than Gutmann, however, in specifying the
moral character necessary for republican citizenship. Just as I
have argued that responsibility and cultural literacy are neces-
sary elements of republican citizenship, I would suggest that the
inclination to act responsibly and in accord with basic cultural
norms is part of the moral character conducive to republican
citizenship. Citizens should not only know how they are supposed
to behave, they should actually behave that way most of the
time. Moral reasoning, whether individual or communal, may
occasionally lead one to the conclusion that in a particular in-
" Jean Baechler, Virtue: Its Nature, Exigency, and Acquisition, 34 Nomos 25, 47
(1992). For a thorough discussion of Aristotle's insistence on moral character for republi-
can citizenship, see Galston, 82 Cal L Rev at 372-78 (cited in note 27).
1'9 Wilson, On Character at 108 (cited in note 106).
9 Gutmann, Democratic Education at 52 (cited in note 112).
191 Id.
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stance, it is better to act contrary to cultural norms, or even in a
manner that might appear to be irresponsible. But republican
citizens-full members of a constituted and functioning communi-
ty-should be predisposed to act responsibly and in accord with
community norms, justifying departures through critical thought
and dialogue. Otherwise, moral reasoning becomes pure sophism,
driven solely by the desire to reach particular results.
My suggestion that moral character includes the inclination
to act in accordance with cultural norms is, of course, intimately
related to my discussion of cultural literacy. Again, I want to
stress that I am talking about only the most basic sorts of cultur-
al norms, which are, I hope, relatively uncontested (although not
always emphasized): individual responsibility, honesty, hard
work, tolerance, and so on. I am specifically not talking about
contested norms on such things as sexuality, religious beliefs, or
gender roles. Some of those norms may be specified by the under-
lying vision of the good life in a mixed liberal-republican regime:
an examined life in both individual and citizen capacities. Other-
wise, a republican polity deliberates about whether to leave such
decisions entirely to individuals, and if not, about what norms
ought to be imposed or encouraged.'92
The best definition of the sort of moral character I mean
comes from James Q. Wilson:
[T1o have a good character means at least two things: empa-
thy and self-control. Empathy refers to a willingness to take
importantly into account the rights, needs, and feelings of
others. Self-control refers to a willingness to take important-
ly into account the more distant consequences of present
actions; to be in short somewhat more future oriented rather
than wholly present oriented.'9'
19 Obviously, our nation has already made some of these decisions. The Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment, for example, makes clear that decisions about religious
beliefs are to be left to individuals. If we had adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, by
contrast, it might be viewed as a decision to mandate particular norms about gender
roles.
1" Wilson, On Character at 5 (cited in note 106). See also id at 22 ("By virtue, I mean
habits of moderate action; more specifically, acting with due restraint on one's impulses,
due regard for the rights of others, and reasonable concern for distant consequences.").
Similarly, Amitai Etzioni (speaking for the Communitarian movement), notes that chil-
dren should be taught both character and core values:
We mean by character the psychological muscles that allow a person to control im-
pulses and defer gratification, which is essential for achievement, performance, and
moral conduct. The core values... [include:] hard work pays, even in an unfair
world; treat others with the same basic dignity with which you wish to be treated (or
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There are other qualities that go into good character, but my
emphasis on responsibility-for oneself and toward others-is
well captured in Wilson's description.
Educating for moral character faces an obstacle that my two
previous injunctions do not. Teaching critical thinking and cul-
tural literacy may be controversial and infrequent, but there is
little question that teaching both subjects is possible. Whether
schools can teach moral character, however, is an open question.
I cannot possibly resolve that question in this Article, but I can
note what seems almost universally agreed upon: if it is possible
to teach moral character, it must be done at least partly by ex-
ample.19
Even advocating that children be taught moral character by
example is controversial, however. One aspect of responsibility,
as I suggested earlier, is avoiding single teenage parenthood.
Single parenthood, especially among poor teenagers, is irrespon-
sible and severely jeopardizes the potential for future republican
citizenship of both parent and child by lowering educational,
economic, and social opportunities. Single teachers who become
pregnant (or cause a pregnancy 95 ) and choose to bear and keep
the child are setting a very poor example for their charges. Nev-
face the consequences); you feel better when you do what is right than when you
evade your moral precepts.
Etzioni, The Spirit of Community at 91 (cited in note 81). Miriam Galston more fully de-
velops a list of similar character traits necessary for republican citizenship:
First, there are those character traits that are observable in people who are delibera-
tive in their own lives: moderation in acquisitiveness and certain kinds of ambition;
purposefulness; carefulness; attention to detail; perseverance; the willingness to deferimmediate gratification; confidence that progress is possible and that human action
can shape events; respect for, although not slavishness to, rules and traditions; and
the ability to distinguish the speaker from the speech in order to take seriously ideas
and arguments regardless of one's degree of affinity with their advocates. The second
category would consist of character traits that tend to create or reinforce our bonds
with others: loyalty to others; concern about and responsibility for the well-being of
others; and honesty in our dealings with others.
Galston, 82 Cal L Rev at 381 (cited in note 27).
1" See, for example, Gutmann, Democratic Education at 57 (cited in note 112);
Baechler, 34 Nomos at 47-48 (cited in note 188); Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore, High
School Achievement (cited in note 180); Wynne and Ryan, Reclaiming Our Schools at 113
(cited in note 58); Theodore R. Sizer, Horace's Compromise: The Dilemma of the American
High School 123-25 (Houghton Mifflin, 1984).
" While causing a pregnancy in these circumstances is equally irresponsible, it is not
equally detectable. For that reason, I focus-as have the cases-on pregnant teachers.
Nevertheless, the reasoning in the text should apply as well to single men who cause a
pregnancy, although the question is somewhat clouded by the greater choice of the woman
in determining whether to bear the child.
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ertheless, at least one federal court of appeals has consistently
prohibited school districts from firing unwed pregnant teach-
ers.
19
Even private organizations have been challenged for their
attempts to provide role models. One educational organization
that worked mostly with poor, black, teenage girls tried to en-
courage them not to become pregnant because it reduced their
opportunities. When one of its single staff members became preg-
nant, she was fired. Although the firing was ultimately upheld by
the courts,'97 there was a protracted lawsuit, a dissent by one
member of the court of appeals who found that the firing was a
violation of Title VII,' and a law review article by a Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania professor arguing that the action was racist
and sexist. 9
The arguments on behalf of the pregnant teachers are con-
siderable, but are all based on considering rights devoid of re-
sponsibility. A more balanced approach would recognize that,
while mature adults should have the right to procreate when and
as they choose, it is irresponsible to do so under conditions so
detrimental to both parent and child. Reconciling rights and
responsibilities in this context is exactly the sort of difficult bal-
ancing exercise that a mixed liberal-republican regime requires.
Our current rights-oriented liberalism tends too much toward
protecting the right and ignoring the responsibility, especially
where the government is involved. A purely republican approach
might jettison procreative rights and penalize the bearing of
illegitimate children under all circumstances.0 0 My approach
tries to accommodate both the right and the responsibility by
suggesting that the right must yield if, and only if, there is an
additional factor counseling responsible behavior: the potential
interference with education for citizenship. Thus, while most
1" Avery v Homewood City Board of Education, 674 F2d 337, 341-42 (5th Cir 1982);
Andrews v Drew Municipal Separate School District, 507 F2d 611, 615-16 (5th Cir 1975).
See also Ponton v Newport News School Board, 632 F Supp 1056, 1062-64 (D Va 1986)
(forcing pregnant unmarried teacher to take leave of absence violates Constitution and
Title VII).
'" Chambers v Omaha Girls Club, 629 F Supp 925, 951-52 (D Neb 1986), aff'd 834
F2d 697, 704 (8th Cir 1987).
19 Chambers, 834 F2d at 705-09 (McMillian dissenting). See also Chambers v Omaha
Girls Club, 840 F2d 583, 583 (8th Cir 1988) (Lay dissenting in denial of reh'g en banc)
(arguing that action was a per se violation of Title VII).
19 Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis L Rev 539, 555.
See, for example, Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter (Ticknor, Reed, and
Fields, 1850).
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adults have the freedom to procreate irresponsibly, those whose
irresponsibility redounds to the detriment of both their own off-
spring and other children whose virtue they are charged with
forming are subject to a different balancing of rights and respon-
sibilities.2"'
Another way to instill moral character in children is to give
them responsibility and let them exercise moral choices-with
real consequences-during the course of their education. 212 "The
choice to act morally is self-reinforcing, creating momentum for
acting morally on the next occasion, and the next, and strength-
ening the foundation upon which future moral actions will be
based."2 3 The most obvious way to accomplish this is to reward
the moral behaviors we want to encourage and punish those we
want to discourage. In other words, children should learn that
hard work begets rewards, and that dishonesty, laziness, and
interference with other children's educational opportunities lead
to punishment. It is worth noting that a number of scholars have
made concrete suggestions for implementing schemes that reward
effort and punish the lack of it. These include treating academic
performance the way we do athletic performance, 24 establish-
ing entrance tests for all courses,2 5 increasing both expecta-
201 Similarly, although a married pregnant teacher may provide some perverse role
models for her charges-they may emulate her motherhood without also emulating her
marital status-the very fact that her behavior is not in itself irresponsible should insu-
late her from-any penalty. Thus, just as neither discriminatory effect nor discriminatory
intent can alone make out a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, see Washington v
Davis, 426 US 229, 239 (1976) (discriminatory effect), and Palmer v Thompson, 403 US
217, 224 (1971) (discriminatory intent), procreative rights need not yield unless the act of
procreating is irresponsible and sets a poor example.
Although Aristotle said it first, Thomas Jefferson said it best: "The moral sense, or
conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm.... It may be strengthened by
exercise, as may any particular limb of the body." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter
Carr (Aug 10, 1787), in Paul L. Ford, ed, 5 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 322, 323
(Putnam's Sons, 1905). Others have also noted in more concrete and practical terms that
exercising moral choices develops and strengthens moral character. See, for example,
Wynne and Ryan, Reclaiming Our Schools (cited in note 58).
203 Bartlett, 98 Yale L J at 301 (cited in note 54).
204 Wynne and Ryan, Reclaiming Our Schools at 46-49 (cited in note 58). Their sugges-
tions include public rewards, high standards, summary dismissal from desired programs
for rules infractions, emphasizing loyalty to teammates, and using pride rather than fun
as motivation.
Murray, Losing Ground at 225-27 (cited in note 31). Students would be permitted
to take any entrance test any number of times. Murray outlines five lessons that would be
taught by his system: "Effort is often rewarded with success. Effort is not always reward-
ed with success. Failure in one instance does not mean inability to succeed in anything
else. Failure in one try does not mean perpetual failure. The better the preparation, the
more likely the success." Id at 226. He summarizes the difference between the current
educational system and his own as that the current system "does not teach... stu-
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tions and discipline,"' and including public service as part of
educational requirements.0 7 Unfortunately, some attempts at
requiring responsibility have invited challenge from a rights-ori-
ented perspective. One school district in Pennsylvania was sued
for requiring high school students to perform community volun-
teer work as a condition for graduation.0 8
One thing that all the suggestions for fostering moral charac-
ter seem to have in common is a recognition that children are not
naturally hardworking and responsible, and that education is
hard work that is not always fun. Hegel's criticism of Rousseau's
theory of education is similar and accurate:
The play theory of education assumes that what is childish
is itself already something of inherent worth and presents it
as such to the children; in their eyes it lowers serious pur-
suits, and education itself, to a form of childishness for
which the children themselves have scant respect. The advo-
cates of this method represent the child, in the immaturity
in which he feels himself to be, as really mature and they
struggle to make him satisfied with himself as he is. But
they corrupt and distort his genuine and proper need for
something better .... 209
Although a shift from emphasizing play to emphasizing learning
is probably useful in all aspects of education, it is most useful in
encouraging the habits of diligence and perseverance that are
necessary parts of the moral character of republican citizens.
Stressing the development of moral character rather than follow-
ing the natural inclinations of the child does not mean that
schooling must return to the days of silent rote learning and
corporal punishment, however. There are many ways to teach
children that everything is not relative and that effort is neces-
sary and rewarded-and some ways can also be fun. Learning to
produce music, for example, teaches children to respect the fun-
damental unmalleability of some things (a note is either flat or
dents ... how to fail." Id at 226-27.
206 Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore, High School Achievement at 105, 120-21, 178, 185,
192 (cited in note 180); Murray, Losing Ground at 174 (cited in note 31); Ratner, 63 Tex L
Rev at 802-03 (cited in note 109).
2'07 Etzioni, The Spirit of Community at 113-15 (cited in note 81).
' Steirer v Bethlehem Area School District, 987 F2d 989, 992 (3d Cir 1993) (uphold-
ing constitutionality of requirement).
' George Willhein Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right 175 at 118 (Oxford,
1945) (T.M. Knox, trans). See also Putnam, 63 S Cal L Rev at 1696-97 (cited in note 2);
O'Keeffe, Diligence Abandoned at 183 (cited in note 180).
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not, a C or not, and so on) and to expect a joyous reward (the
correctly played music itself) for diligent effort.
Unfortunately, both an emphasis on character and abandon-
ment of the play theory of education are inconsistent with what
one author has accurately called "public education's current fasci-
nation with 'self-esteem' rather than achievement," which "puts
feelings ahead of actual learning."210 In other words, the most
important part of an education today seems to be that the stu-
dents have "a good experience."21' Moreover, because Americans
are suspicious about teaching moral values, 212 "Itihe fundamen-
tal tragedy of American education today is not that we are turn-
ing out ignoramuses, but that we are turning out savages."213
As with cultural literacy and critical thinking, then, my admoni-
tion to teach moral character is neither uncontroversial nor in
accord with current educational practice.
III. EDUCATIONAL POLICY
So far, I have suggested that an education for responsible
republican citizenship should stress familiarity with and alle-
giance to American culture, the ability to think critically about
issues (including cultural norms), and character traits such as
diligence and honesty that promote responsible behavior in both
private and public life. I turn now to a more specifically legal
question: what aspects of Supreme Court doctrines on schools
and schooling encourage or inhibit this type of education?
A. General Considerations
While it is not my purpose in this Article to examine specific
educational strategies, it is useful to provide an overview of the
types of schools and school environments that have been shown
to produce academically and socially successful students. A sur-
vey of the literature helps confirm and justify my argument that
increasing emphasis on individual and family responsibility for
education will improve performance.
The two most influential bodies of literature on this subject
are the studies done by James Coleman and others,2 4 and the
210 Sykes, A Nation of Victims at 244 (cited in note 74).
21 See Hirsch, Cultural Literacy at 122-25 (cited in note 149).
21 Miriam Galston insightfully explores and refutes some of the primary intellectual
reasons for this suspicion. See Galston, 82 Cal L Rev at 386-96 (cited in note 27).
21 Close, Responsive Community Rts & Responsibilities at 23 (cited in note 64).
214 The two most comprehensive studies are James Coleman, et al, Equality of Educa-
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writings of the "effective schools" movement which grew up large-
ly in reaction to Coleman's 1966 study.215 There is a great deal
of controversy about whether schools can affect student perform-
ance at all: later researchers disagree over the validity of
Coleman's original finding that family factors, rather than school
factors, are largely responsible for variations in student perform-
ance.216 A review of the literature, however, suggests that the
dispute is less substantive than the participants make it out to
be. Several conclusions seem generally agreed upon, and I will
rely primarily on those less controversial conclusions.
Most of the studies conclude that differences in achievement
are not due to easily measurable (and easily, if expensively, re-
mediable) differences between schools, such as facilities, libraries,
teacher qualifications, teacher salaries, or class size.217 Most of
the researchers also agree that there are less-tangible differences
between effective and ineffective schools. The factors most com-
monly identified as producing effective schools are good discipline
and high teacher expectations for all students (including, for ex-
ample, the assignment of significant amounts of homework). 8
More recent cross-cultural studies have suggested that students
who believe that diligence rather than innate ability governs
school success are likely to achieve more.219 Thus, success is
tional Opportunity (US GPO, 1966); and Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore, High School
Achievement (cited in note 180).
2W See Jaynes and Williams, A Common Destiny at 358 (cited in note 81).
2W Compare J. Behrman, P. Taubman, and T. Wales, Controlling For and Measuring
the Effects of Genetics and Family Environment in Equations for Schooling and Labor
Market Success, in Paul Taubman, ed, Kinometrics: Determinants of Socioeconomic Suc-
cess Within and Between Families 35, 70 (North-Holland, 1977); Eric A. Hanushek,
Throwing Money at Schools, 1 J Policy Analysis & Mgmt 19 (1981); Brian Rowan, Steven
T. Bossert, and David C. Dwyer, Research on Effective Schools: A Cautionary Note, Educ
Researcher 24, 24 (Apr 1983); Ronald F. Ferguson, Paying for Public Education: New
Evidence on How and Why Money Matters, 28 Harv J Legis 465, 467-68 (1991); with
Wilbur Brookover, et al, School Social Systems and Student Achievement: Schools Can
Make a Difference 2-4 (Praeger, 1979); Ronald Edmonds, Characteristics of Effective
Schools, in Ulrie Neisser, ed, The School Achievement of Minority Children: New Perspec-
tives 93, 94-95 (Lawrence Erlbaum, 1986).
217 See, for example, Jaynes and Williams, A Common Destiny at 355 (cited in note
81); Stewart C. Purkey and Marshall S. Smith, Effective Schools: A Review, 83 Elementa-
ry Sch J 427, 427-30 (1983); Eric A. Hanushek, The Economics of Schooling: Production
and Efficiency in Public Schools, 24 J Econ Lit 1141, 1141-42 (1986).
2" See, for example, Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore, High School Achievement at 105,
120, 160-63, 178, 185, 192-93 (cited in note 180); Jaynes and Williams, A Common Destiny
at 356-57, 359-61 (cited in note 81); Purkey and Smith, 83 Elementary Sch J at 431 (cited
in note 217); Harold W. Stevenson, Learning from Asian Schools, Scientific Am 70 (Dec
1992).
2" See Caplan, Choy, and Whitmore, Scientific Am at 36 (cited in note 66); Stevenson,
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most often achieved in orderly classrooms in which both teachers
and students believe that all the students can do well, and act
accordingly. This accords with my suggestion that schools ought
to begin with a presumption that students and their parents bear
significant responsibility for taking advantage of the educational
opportunities offered.
The recent tendency to avoid holding children (or, in the case
of younger children, their families) accountable for their own
shortcomings-one aspect of the more general shift away from
individual responsibility=?--undermines efforts to provide a
successful classroom environment. The more that teachers, ad-
ministrators, and educational theorists-and, by extension, stu-
dents-blame external factors for students' failures, the less
likely it is that students or teachers will expect high perform-
ance. If failure is caused by discrimination, poverty, family cir-
cumstances, or poor teaching, why should a student afflicted by
one of these misfortunes even bother trying? And why would a
teacher believe that any particular student could overcome such
an outcome-determinative handicap? Moreover, the stereotype of
poor, minority students as necessarily low achievers is as untrue
as it is disabling: "Research of the past decade or so has noted
that highly motivated youths are a frequent output of black fami-
ly socialization processes."221
Shifting responsibility back to the individual and away from
society allows us to recognize and reward these high achievers
and to address more directly the individual problems of low
achievers. For example, a focus on individual responsibility
makes it more acceptable to condemn and counter minority stu-
dents who ostracize their classmates for "acting white" ("speaking
standard English, studying long hours, [and] striving to get good
grades").' Moving the emphasis from societal to individual re-
sponsibility also refocuses the debate in a way that highlights
what Charles Murray calls "noneconomic transfers": policies that
inadvertently penalize industrious students in order to avoid
blaming less industrious ones.2
Scientific Am at 70 (cited in note 218). See also Goldman, NY Times at C1 (cited in note
91).
'o For further documentation that the trend extends into educational theory, see
Sykes, A Nation of Victims at 233-35 (cited in note 74).
221 Jaynes and Williams, A Common Destiny at 542 (cited in note 81).
'22 Id at 372.
' Murray, Losing Ground at 199-201 (cited in note 31).
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This is not to say that the state bears no responsibility for
educational failures. Any educational policy that deliberately
marks some children as destined for failure, or deprives them of
any of the three elements of an education for republican citizen-
ship, is unacceptable. The most extreme of these unacceptable
policies, of course, is de jure racial segregation. We can argue for
another four decades about whether Brown v Board of Educa-
tion 4 was correctly reasoned or adequately enforced, but its
conclusion was unequivocally right. A law that says that some
children are not fit to go to school with others simply because of
their race is the very antithesis of an education for responsible
republican citizenship. Not only does it generate among black
students "a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the commu-
nity," decreasing their motivation to learn,' it also fails to
treat them as future responsible citizens. Further, it sends a
message that the state does not expect them to succeed-one of
the surest guarantees that they will not.
On the other hand, recent research suggests that teacher
expectations of students, especially of minority students, vary by
the teacher's socioeconomic status, not her race." Thus,
Wygant v Jackson Board of Education, 7 though castigated for
ignoring children's educational needs by preventing the school
board from firing more senior white teachers instead of laying off
newly hired black teachers,"2 may also be correctly decided: it
is the teacher's expectations, not her race, that matter. Moreover,
since many studies stress parental involvement in a child's
schooling as a vital factor in her academic success, 9 policies
that interfere with parental access and involvement should be
open to question. One such policy is busing in urban school dis-
347 US 483 (1954).
Id at 494.
' Karl Alexander, Doris Entwistle, and Maxine Thompson, School Performance,
Status Relations, and the Structure of Sentiment: Bringing the Teacher Back In, 52 Am
Socio Rev 665, 679-80 (1987). To the extent that race matters, it seems to have a perverse
effect: these researchers found that among high-status teachers, white teachers had low
expectations for black student behavior but not for their cognitive abilities, while black
teachers had low expectations of black students generally. Id at 674.
22 476 US 267 (1986).
"' See id at 307 (Marshall dissenting) ("As a matter of logic as well as fact, a hiring
policy achieves no purpose at all if it is eviscerated by layoffs.").
' See, for example, David L. Stevenson and David P. Baker, The Family-School
Relation and the Child's School Performance, 58 Child Development 1348, 1348-49 (1987);
Joyce L. Epstein, Parent Involvement: What Research Says to Administrators, 19 Educ &
Urban Soc 119, 119-20 (1987); Joan L. Herman and Jennie P. Yeh, Some Effects of Parent
Involvement in Schools, 15 Urban Rev 11, 11-12 (1983).
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tricts: parents, especially poor parents dependent on public trans-
portation, are much less likely to become involved in school activ-
ities or attend parent-teacher conferences if their children's
schools are located far from home. Recent cases that rely less on
busing as a remedy for segregated schools may therefore also be
on the right track.
A theory of responsible republican education thus has some
general utility in evaluating legal doctrine on a broad range of
educational topics, including questions of race. But the two areas
that might benefit most from the change of focus offered by my
theory are specific to education: school policies (especially curric-
ular policies) that are challenged or justified as value inculcation,
and school financing. The remainder of this Article will therefore
focus on current doctrine in those two areas and on how a theory
of responsible republicanism might reshape those doctrines or
their justifications.
It might be helpful at the outset to state the limits of my
proposals. I am not suggesting that an education for republican
citizenship is constitutionally mandated, nor that there is neces-
sarily a constitutional right to such an education." Rather, I
am arguing that our constitutional doctrine about education
ought to be influenced by our republican heritage, both as a mat-
ter of history" and as a matter of policy. In other words, what
might the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech or equal
protection of the laws mean in the context of an education for
republican citizenship? In the preceding Parts, I have tried to
describe and justify a particular moral focus and a concomitant
educational approach as more likely to produce responsible re-
publican citizens. This Part is an attempt to evaluate existing
legal doctrine in light of that description.
' Others have proposed a constitutional right to education. See, for example, Amar,
13 Harv J L & Pub Policy at 40 (cited in note 32); Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Founda-
tions for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the
National Education Crisis, 86 Nw U L Rev 550, 574-630 (1992); Julius Chambers, Ade-
quate Education for All: A Right, an Achievable Goal, 22 Harv CR-CL L Rev 55, 67-72
(1987); R. George Wright, The Place of Public School Education in the Constitutional
Scheme, 13 SIU L J 53, 72-80 (1988).
"1 For overviews of the historical influence of republicanism, see generally Suzanna Sher-
ry, The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution: A Lawyers' Guide to Contemporary Histor-
ical Scholarship, 5 Const Commentary 323 (1988); Sherry, 78 Minn L Rev 61 (cited in
note 23).
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B. School Policies
The import of my suggestions for school policies, especially
curricular decisions, is obvious at one level: schools should teach
cultural literacy, critical thinking, and moral character. Applica-
tion of that principle to concrete situations, however, takes some
care. Indeed, the Supreme Court, which has paid lip service to
the idea of education for citizenship for many years, has an in-
consistent and unpredictable record on school policies. Thus, this
Section is intended largely to be clarifying and corrective: if the
Supreme Court means what it says about education for citizen-
ship, some of its decisions need to be reevaluated in light of the
actual educational needs of future citizens.
Perhaps the first case in the United States to recognize the
importance of education for citizenship was Trustees of the Uni-
versity of North Carolina v Foy, decided in 1805 by the North
Carolina Supreme Court. 2 In the course of deciding that the
state legislature did not have the power to deprive the university
of property, the court described education as "a right highly es-
teemed in all civilized nations.., a right of acquiring knowledge
and good morals, which have always been deemed most condu-
cive to the happiness and prosperity of a people." 3 The court's
statement reflected a wealth of American republican thinking on
education and citizenship. Under this view, a nation cannot pros-
per, nor can liberty be protected, without a good and virtuous cit-
izenry, which in turn depends on an education stressing both
knowledge and virtue.'
The concept that education is vital to citizenship has carried
forward into modern Supreme Court cases. The most eloquent
(and most frequently quoted) illustration of the Supreme Court's
view of the essential nature of education is from Brown. The
Court described education as "the very foundation of good citizen-
ship," and "a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment." 5
In fact, as the Court noted in 1973, "an abiding respect for the
vital role of education in a free society may be found in numerous
opinions of Justices of this Court writing both before and after
2 5 NC (1 Mur) 58 (1805).
233 Id at 84.
' For an elaboration of the historical pedigree of this concept, see Sherry, 78 Minn L
Rev at 68 (cited in note 23).
25 347 US at 493.
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Brown was decided."236 As early as 1923"3 and as recently as
1990,"3 the Court has stressed that education prepares children
for citizenship by transmitting and inculcating values, and by
giving children the knowledge and skills necessary to participate
in a democratic polity.
In particular, the Court has at different times focused on,
and explicitly or implicitly recognized as legitimate, all three of
my suggested bases of an education for republican citizenship:
the transmission of cultural values, the fostering of habits of
critical thought, and the development of good character 9.23  Its
application of these principles, however, is uneven. In part, this
is because the actual cases involve different constitutional provi-
sions with different histories and doctrines. A Court that regu-
lates public education through the blunt instruments of the reli-
gion clauses, the Free Speech Clause, and the various versions of
the Equal Protection Clause is unlikely to hit upon a coherent
educational theory except by accident. Indeed, viewed in this
light, the Court's record is quite good. As I will suggest, the re-
sults are justifiable in all but a few of the cases, although the
reasoning is often less than illuminating.
The larger part of the problem, which the Court shares with
many commentators who have tried to balance inculcation of
values against freedom of speech and inquiry, is that value incul-
cation-whether in teaching cultural literacy or in the formation
of moral character-is frequently thought to conflict with the
teaching of critical thinking. It need not be.2° As I hope my
substantive discussion of republican education made clear, a
citizen needs to be able both to understand and internalize the
norms of her society and to judge those norms against rational
attack. A predisposition to adopt certain values, coupled with the
San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 30 (1973).
See Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 400 (1923).
See Board of Education v Mergens, 496 US 226, 265 (1990).
On transmission of cultural values, see, for example, Ambach v Norwick, 441 US
68, 76, 77, 80 (1979); Board of Education v Pico, 457 US 853, 864 (1982); Plyler v Doe, 457
US 202, 222 n 20 (1982); Brown, 347 US at 493; West Virginia Board of Education v
Barnette, 319 US 624, 631 & n 11 (1943). On critical thinking, see, for example, Pico, 457
US at 866, 868; Barnette, 319 US at 637; Tinker v Des Moines Independent Community
School District, 393 US 503, 511-12 (1969). On character, including by role modeling, see,
for example, Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205, 233 (1972); Bethel School District v Fraser,
478 US 675, 681, 683 (1986); Hazelwood School District v Kuhlmeier, 484 US 260, 272
(1988).
Toni Massaro has suggested that, indeed, the critical and assimilationist ideals
represent "competing parts of the American personality." Massaro, Constitutional Literacy
at 101 (cited in note 181).
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knowledge and critical skills necessary for citizenship, is likely to
yield slow but careful changes that jeopardize neither the stabili-
ty of the polity nor the liberties of its citizens. In other words, to
the extent that republican citizens must engage in "considered
judgment"24' in their public lives, such an act requires both a
willingness and a reluctance to alter the status quo. Both un-
thinking adherence to tradition and an overeagerness for change
for its own sake, with hasty and irrational decisions, are likely to
do damage. On the other hand, both the assimilationist and criti-
cal approaches I advocate have a tendency to guard against these
twin perils.
In the end, it is not difficult to translate these principles into
doctrine, although it is not the doctrine of any particular provi-
sion of the Constitution. My approach to questions touching on
educational policies is quite simple. In each case, I ask whether
the policy at issue undermines any of the three bases of a respon-
sible republican education: cultural literacy, critical thinking, and
moral character. A brief review of some of the more important or
controversial decisions of the last half-century should illustrate
this standard.
The most contested dispute is over school censorship of stu-
dent speech. As John Marshall once observed in a rather differ-
ent context, the controversy is "deeply interesting to the United
States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its inter-
est."242 The cases usually pit student claims of independent,
critical speech against the school's purported need to keep order
and transmit values. But this is a false dichotomy. Most student
speech, like the armbands worn by the high school students in
Tinker v Des Moines Independent Community School District,'
is rational, civil, and a model of reasoned republican dialogue.
Where the student speech is irrational or uncivil, as the Court
found young Matthew Fraser's sexual innuendo to be,' there
is no harm in suppressing it. There may even be an educational
benefit in doing so. Critical dialogue need not be uncivil; indeed,
241 The particular phrase is Ackerman's, We the People at 272 (cited in note 20), but
the idea is common to all the neo-republicans.
2 2 Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
243 393 US 503, 508 (1969).
24 Fraser, 478 US at 683 (description of student government candidate in an "elabo-
rate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor" at a high school assembly). The hardest
question in cases like these is determining whether the speech is in fact sufficiently lewd
or uncivil that it violates basic community norms. I would generally leave that judgment
up to school officials.
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civility-especially in its concern for the sensibilities of others-is
a moral value that is particularly useful in a diverse democracy.
Thus, permitting students to criticize authority if they do so civil-
ly and rationally teaches all the right lessons: some ways of be-
having are irresponsible and wrong, but moral reasoning and
dialogue never are.
On this view, the Supreme Court probably got it wrong in
Hazelwood School District v Kuhlmeier: 5 student articles on
teen pregnancy and divorce, however controversial, should not be
censored if they are responsible pieces of journalism. 6 One im-
portant caveat here is that I would apply this limit on speech
only to children, and only in order to teach them to exercise re-
sponsibly the full rights of free speech that they will inherit as
adults. As one judge put it, "[T]he First Amendment gives a high
school student the classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but
not Cohen's jacket."24v Thus, hate speech regulations, for exam-
ple, while intolerable if imposed on adults, may be appropriate to
teach young children tolerance and sensitivity."5
The flip side of the student speech question is curricular and
library decisions. Just as some student speech is alleged to inter-
fere with the transmission of cultural norms or the development
of moral character, schools often defend curricular choices as a
way of furthering those goals. The Court, however, has fairly
consistently invalidated efforts to inculcate values if-and only
if-such efforts attempt to prescribe political orthodoxy or to
insulate it from principled or critical opposition.
A series of cases spanning more than forty years exemplifies
the Court's jurisprudence in this area. In West Virginia Board of
Education v Barnette, the Court struck down mandatory flag
salutes. 9 In the process, it recognized a difference between the
sort of role modeling and predisposition that characterize respon-
sible republican value-inculcation on the one hand, and pre-
scribed political orthodoxy that brooks no opposition on the other:
"National unity as an end which officials may foster by persua-
24s 484 US 260, 270 (1988).
24 There are some hints in the opinion that the articles were not responsible journal-
ism, but the principal's action and testimony suggest that that charge was manufactured.
See id at 284-85 (Brennan dissenting).
17 Thomas v Board of Education, 607 F2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir 1979) (Newman concur-
ring), quoted in Fraser, 478 US at 682.
' Such regulations would be inappropriate, however, if they were applied in such a
way as to interfere with legitimate, rational, and civil debate on matters of public impor-
tance.
249 319 US at 624, 642 (1943).
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sion and example is not in question. The problem is whether
under our Constitution compulsion as here employed is a permis-
sible means for its achievement."25 Barnette is, in fact, an ex-
cellent model of the responsible republican approach to education
that I am advocating. In addition to drawing the distinction just
noted, the Barnette Court recognized the importance of teaching
history and civics in order to "inspire patriotism and love of coun-
try,""' while simultaneously rejecting policies that might
"strangle the free mind at its source." 2 There is, as the Court
implicitly accepted, no conflict between the two.
In Board of Education v Pico, the Court similarly struck
down an attempt to protect orthodoxy, 3 although its reasoning
was less exemplary. The Court in Pico allowed a challenge to a
school board's attempt to remove objectionable books from the
school library. A majority of the Court, however, found the
practice potentially unconstitutional because of both the
removal's purpose (rather than its effects) 4 and the students'
right to receive information.
The focus on purpose is doubly problematic. First, as the
dissent in Pico points out, the students' right to receive informa-
tion is equally infringed whatever the reasons behind the remov-
al." Moreover, since the removal of politically objectionable
books both constricts the students' ability to learn critical think-
ing by example and comparison and sends a message to students
that orthodoxy is required, it undermines the teaching of critical
thinking. The motivation of the school board, while perhaps im-
portant from a First Amendment standpoint, is irrelevant to a re-
sponsible republican analysis: if the goal is to produce responsi-
ble republican citizens, any interference with learning to think
critically is suspect, no matter how well-intentioned.
What is really at stake in the Court's opinions in Pico, as
Richard Pildes has noted, is achieving the right balance between
critical thought and value inculcation: "Pico must rest on a con-
stitutional distinction between public education designed to de-
velop critical, rational, and democratic capacities, and education
designed to ensure that students conform to currently prevailing
community perceptions of 'correct' ideas." 6
2 Id at 640.
2"1 Id at 631.
252 Id at 637.
2' 457 US 853 (1982).
See id at 872 (plurality opinion); id at 877 (Blackmun concurring).
Id at 895 (Powell dissenting).
Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in
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More subtle examples of the Court's willingness to invalidate
curricular decisions that protect orthodoxy by undermining criti-
cal thought are Epperson v Arkansas, in which the court invali-
dated Arkansas's ban on the teaching of evolution, 7 and Ed-
wards v Aguillard, in which the Court struck down Louisana's
attempt to mandate the teaching of creationism." Again, while
the Establishment Clause jurisprudence that the Court utilized
in each case focused primarily on the purpose of the statute, the
two laws would be equally invalid under the effects test I am
proposing here. Creationism is not science: rather than open-
mindedly seeking the truth, it imposes a single, authoritarian
answer to the question of human origins, derived not from criti-
cal inquiry but from the Bible. Thus, either prohibiting the teach-
ing of legitimate science, or requiring the teaching of religion in
the guise of science, undermines critical inquiry. 9 Such an at-
tempt is the antithesis of an education for republican citizenship,
for it deprives children of both the knowledge that they may
challenge authority and the skills that enable them to do so.
In one case, however, the Court failed to recognize a threat
to critical thinking. In Wisconsin v Yoder, the Court allowed
Amish parents to deprive their children of an otherwise-mandato-
ry high school education.Y6 The Court's sympathetic rendering
of Amish life and values, and its suggestion that high school's
emphasis on "intellectual and scientific accomplishments" was
unnecessary and even inimical to the Amish way of life,2"' can-
not disguise the fact that the Court's ruling prevented Amish
children from acquiring the capabilities they need to become full
citizens of the broader republic. What the Court said about the
absolute denial of education in Plyler v Doe is equally apt with
regard to the denial of an adequate education for citizenship: "By
denying these children a basic education, we deny them the abili-
ty to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and fore-
close any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the
smallest way to the progress of our Nation."2
Constitutional Law, 45 Hastings L J 711, 734 (1994).
' 393 US 97, 107 (1968).
482 US 578, 587 (1986).
For an alternative view of how creationism is inconsistent with critical thought, see
Gutmann, Democratic Education at 101-04 (cited in note 112).
26 406 US 205, 234 (1972).
2" Id at 211-12.
457 US 202, 223 (1982). Douglas's dissent in Yoder made a similar point: "If a par-
ent keeps his child out of school beyond grade school, then that child will forever be
barred from entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have today." 406
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If the Court has largely been willing, nevertheless, to invali-
date attempts to instill cultural literacy or foster moral character
when those attempts undermine the equally important education-
al task of teaching critical skills, it has also been willing to allow
fairly heavy-handed cultural inculcation where there is no threat
to critical thought. In Ambach v Norwick, the Court upheld New
York's decision to exclude aliens who had no desire to become
United States citizens from teaching in public schools."' The
plaintiffs in Ambach were in fact eligible for citizenship but re-
fused to apply." The Court relied on two assumptions that are
perfectly congruent with responsible republican education: that
schools are important in "the preparation of individuals for par-
ticipation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on
which our society rests,"6 5 and that "a teacher serves as a role
model for his students, exerting a subtle but important influence
over their perceptions and values."266 Thus, a teacher who delib-
erately chooses to place her primary loyalty and confidence else-
where (and who may therefore intentionally or inadvertantly
communicate to her charges the values on which that choice is
based) is a poor role model for future American citizens. The
basic assimilationist underpinning of my approach is broad
enough to encompass Ambach.
In conclusion, if the Court's record on broad educational
policy questions is- evaluated from the standpoint of a responsible
republican education, it has seriously erred only twice (in Yoder
and Kuhlmeier)Y6 7 Beginning with a premise that the purpose
of education is to produce responsible republican citizens can
US at 245. Yoder appears to be an anomaly. More recent attempts by religious groups to
insist on governmental assistance in isolating their children from the general culture have
failed. See, for example, Mozert v Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F2d 1058,
1070 (6th Cir 1987) (denying parents the right to withdraw their children from particular
classes that conflicted with parents' religious beliefs); Board of Education of Kiryas Joel
Village School District v Grumet, 114 S Ct 2481, 2494 (1994) (striking down establishment
of separate school district for children of Hasidic Jews).
441 US 68, 80-81 (1979).
Id at 71. The challenged statute exempted from the ban aliens who manifested a
desire to become citizens, whether or not they were actually eligible for citizenship at the
time. Only those who unilaterally chose not to become citizens were prohibited from
teaching in the public schools. Id at 70 & nn 1-2.
26 Id at 76.
20 Id at 78-79.
' Moreover, the Court has navigated these difficult shoals without obvious influence
by political factors: of the correctly decided cases, some are castigated by the left and
some by the right. On the other hand, of the two I have suggested are incorrectly decided,
one (Kuhlmeier) is the bane and the other (Yoder) the darling of many politically liberal
academics.
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thus shed light on an otherwise rambling and uncertain area of
the law. It can also, I hope, illuminate what has become the mod-
ern educational controversy: school financing.
C. School Financing
Since the Supreme Court threw the issue of financial inequi-
ties between school districts back to the state courts in 1973,2"
the courts of at least twenty-nine states have ruled on the ques-
tion, some of them several times.269 The New Jersey Supreme
Court alone has invalidated five different legislative schemes.1
There is little consistency in analysis or outcome; similar or iden-
tical constitutional provisions have often yielded opposite deci-
San Antonio School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 54-55 (1973).
See Alabama Coalition for Equality v Hunt, 1993 WL 204083, *62-63 (Ala Cir);
Shofstall v Hollins, 110 Ariz 88, 515 P2d 590 (1973); Dupree v Alma School District, 297
Ark 340, 651 SW2d 90, 95 (1983); Serrano v Priest, 5 Cal 3d 584, 96 Cal Rptr 601 (1971)
("Serrano 1"); Serrano v Priest, 18 Cal 3d 728, 135 Cal Rptr 345 (1977) ("Serrano I");
Lujan v Colorado Board of Education, 649 P2d 1005, 1018-19 (Colo 1982); Horton v
Meskill, 172 Con 615, 376 A2d 359, 374-75 (1977); Sheff v O'Neill, 42 Conn Supp 172,
609 A2d 1072, 1076 (Con Super 1992); McDaniel v Thomas, 248 Ga 632, 285 SE2d 156,
168 (1981); Thompson v Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P2d 635, 651-52 (1975); Idaho
Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 850 P2d 724, 732-34
(1993); Rose v Council for Better Education, 790 SW2d 186, 206-09 (Ky 1989); Hornbeck v
Somerset County Board of Education, 295 Md 597, 458 A2d 758, 785-86 (1983); McDuffy v
Executive Office of Education, 415 Mass 545, 615 NE2d 516, 552-54 (1993); Milliken v
Green, 389 Mich 1, 203 NW2d 457, 471-72 (1972), vacated, 390 Mich 1, 212 NW2d 711,
721 (1973); E. Jackson Public Schools v State, 133 Mich App 132, 348 NW2d 303, 306
(1984); Skeen v State, 505 NW2d 299, 318 (Min 1993); Helena Elementary School District
v State, 236 Mont 44, 769 P2d 684, 690 (1989); Gould v Orr, 244 Neb 163, 506 NW2d 349,
353 (1993); Robinson v Cahill, 67 NJ 473, 303 A2d 273, 295 (1973); Abbott v Burke, 119
NJ 287, 575 A2d 359 (1990); Reform Education Financing Inequality Today v Cuomo, 152
Misc 2d 714, 578 NYS2d 969, 975-76 (Sup Ct 1991); Britt v North Carolina Board of
Education, 86 NC App 282, 357 SE2d 432, 437 (1987); Board of Education of Cincinnati v
Walter, 58 Ohio St 2d 368, 390 NE2d 813, 822 (1979); Fair School Finance Council of
Oklahoma, Inc. v State, 746 P2d 1135, 1150 (Okla 1987); Olsen v State, 276 Or 9, 554 P2d
139, 147 (1976); Coalition for Equitable School Funding Inc. v State, 311 Or 300, 811 P2d
116, 127 (1991); Danson v Casey, 484 Pa 415, 399 A2d 360, 367 (1979); Richland County v
Campbell, 294 SC 346, 364 SE2d 470, 472 (1988); Tennessee Small School Systems v
McWherter, 851 SW2d 139, 156 (Tenn 1993); Edgewood Independent School District v
Kirby, 777 SW2d 391, 397 (Tex 1989); Edgewood Independent School District v Kirby, 804
SW2d 491, 497 (Tex 1991); Carrollton-Farmers Branch Independent School District v
Edgewood Independent School District, 826 SW2d 489, 503 (Tex 1992); Seattle School
District v State, 90 Wash 2d 476, 585 P2d 71, 104 (1978); Pauley v Kelly, 162 W Va 672,
255 SE2d 859, 879-80 (1979); Buse v Smith, 74 Wis 2d 550, 247 NW2d 141, 155 (1976);
Kukor v Grover, 148 Wis 2d 469, 436 NW2d 568, 585 (1989); Washakie County School
District v Herschler, 606 P2d 310, 332 (Wyo 1980).
"0 For a review of the first four court cases, see Jerry Gray, Ruling Puts New Jersey
in Eye of School Financing Issue, NY Times B6 (Sept 2, 1993). The New Jersey Supreme
Court invalidated the legislature's latest attempt in July 1994. Abbott v Burke, 136 NJ
444, 643 A2d 575, 576 (1994).
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sions.27' One state has essentially given up: the Michigan legis-
lature recently repealed the state's only source of public school
funding without enacting any new legislation.2 Commentators
have had a field day.27
With no resolution of this thorny issue in sight, can a respon-
sible republican approach add anything? I believe that it can. In
particular, the concept that education should be designed to pro-
duce functioning citizens and the recognition that individual
students and their parents have an important role to play in
education can yield two insights that are not prominent on the
surface of the current debate. First, there is a difference between
an adequate education and a financially equal one. Second, guar-
anteeing even an adequate education is not solely the responsibil-
ity of the state; thus the appropriate remedy for failures is not
necessarily to force the state to fund schools more equally. I deal
with each of these propositions in turn.
1. Throwing money at education.
In all the states in which school financing has been chal-
lenged, the problem is that, because school districts generally
finance education partly out of local property taxes, inequalities
arise between property-rich and property-poor or financially over-
burdened school districts. Some courts have responded by requir-
ing the legislature to equalize per-pupil spending between dis-
2' Compare Robinson, 303 A2d at 295 (constitutional requirement of "thorough and
efficient" public school system requires "pqual educational opportunity," and funding
system invalid), with Walter, 390 NE2d at 822 (constitutional requirement of "thorough
and efficient" public school system gives legislature almost unlimited discretion, and
funding system valid). See generally Note, State Constitutional Analyses of Public School
Finance Reform Cases: Myth or Methodology?, 45 Vand L Rev 129, 153 (1991).
7 Michael deCourcy Hinds, Drastic Start From Scratch on Financing for Schools, NY
Times A15 (July 28, 1993). The Michigan teachers union immediately filed a lawsuit chal-
lenging the legislation. Michigan Drops Property Taxes for Schools, Prompting Lawsuit,
NY Times A5 (Aug 21, 1993). Some months later, the legislature decided to rely on an in-
creased sales tax for educational funding.
"' See, for example, Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State
Constitutional Law, 65 Temple L Rev 1325, 1326-29 (1992); Patricia F. First and Louis F.
Miron, The Meaning of an Adequate Education, 70 Educ L Rptr 735, 737-39 (1992);
Edward N. Fadeley, Determining the Scope of State Constitutional Education Guarantees:
A Preliminary Methodology, 28 Willamette L Rev 333, 334-35 (1992); William H. Clune,
New Answers to Hard Questions Posed by Rodriguez: Ending the Separation of School
Finance and Educational Policy by Bridging the Gap Between Wrong and Remedy, 24
Conn L Rev 721, 723-32 (1992); John C. Pittenger, Equity in School Finance: The Federal
Government's Role?, 24 Conn L Rev 757, 758-63 (1992); William E. Thro, The Role of Lan-
guage of the State Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79 Educ L Rptr 19
(1993).
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tricts (or at least to narrow the gap). Some commentators have
suggested that even equal spending is insufficient: poorer school
districts should be given sufficiently more money than richer
ones to ensure that the student outcomes are equal. 4 The va-
lidity of such solutions across the board (rather than in individu-
al cases) depends on two assumptions that are questionable un-
der a responsible republican approach: that an education cannot
be adequate unless it is equal, and that equalizing financial re-
sources will remove the differences among school districts.
From the standpoint of responsible republicanism, all stu-
dents are entitled to the opportunity to obtain an education that
will equip them to exercise the rights and responsibilities of citi-
zenship. Obviously, some school districts are so poor that they
cannot provide such an education. The New Jersey court, for
example, described the conditions at poor urban schools in some
districts:
[I]n 1986 in Paterson a gymnasium floor collapsed in one
school, and in another school the entire building was sink-
ing....
In an elementary school in Paterson, the children eat
lunch in a small area in the boiler room area of the base-
ment; remedial classes are taught in a former bathroom. In
one Irvington school, children attend musical classes in a
storage room and remedial classes in converted closets. At
another school in Irvington a coal bin was converted into a
classroom. In one elementary school in East Orange, there is
no cafeteria, and the children eat lunch in shifts in the first
floor corridor. In one school in Jersey City, built in 1900, the
library is a converted cloakroom; the nurse's office has no
bathroom or waiting room; the lighting is inadequate; the
bathrooms have no hot water... ; there is water damage
inside the building because of cracks in the facade; .and the
heating system is inadequate.275
In the face of evidence like this, it is hard to disagree with the
New Jersey court's holding that the state was not providing a
constitutionally adequate education to all of its children. Even
4 See, for example, Liebman, 90 Colum L Rev at 1647-48 (cited in note 21); Charles
S. Benson, Definitions of Equity in School Finance in Texas, New Jersey, and Kentucky, 28
Harv J Legis 401, 402 (1991).
' Abbott v Burke, 119 NJ 287, 575 A2d 359, 397 (1990). For a chilling description of
the inadequacy of other schools, see Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in
America's Schools (Crown, 1991).
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the Supreme Court has recognized that the absolute deprivation
of an adequate education is constitutionally impermissible. 6
Moreover, it is clear that all of the problems identified by the
New Jersey court could be easily remedied with an infusion of
money into the poorer districts.
But some courts have required legislatures to remedy much
less glaring disparities, and others have invalidated funding
schemes without any showing that the students in poorer dis-
tricts were receiving an inadequate (as opposed to an unequal)
education. For example, the Wyoming Supreme Court invalidated
a legislative scheme simply because it produced funding dispari-
ties, on the ground that "[e]quality of dollar input is manageable
[and] [there is no other viable criterion or test" for determining
the quality or adequacy of education.277 The Washington Su-
preme Court similarly invalidated a system that relied on local
funding because it did not produce "dependable and regular"
income,278 despite an uncontested finding that the plaintiff
school district had teacher salaries above and student-teacher
ratios close to the statewide average." 9 Neither court could
point to specific deficiencies that interfered with the provision of
an adequate educationY50
Focusing on education for republican citizenship changes the
approach from asking whether the education is unequal to asking
whether it is inadequate. In Wisconsin, for example, the state
supreme court refused to invalidate funding disparities because it
found that all children were receiving what it believed to be an
adequate education." Thus, although a school district's pover-
ty, combined with the amount of the financing burden borne by
local property taxes under a particular state's scheme, will usual-
ly result in disparities between that district and wealthier dis-
tricts, it will not always result in an inadequate education. Cer-
tainly the deficiencies noted by the New Jersey court persuasive-
ly established that children in the poorer districts were receiving
" See San Antonio School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 23-24 (1973); Plyler, 457
US at 223.
"' Washakie County School District v Herschler, 606 P2d 310, 334 (Wyo 1980).
, Seattle School District v State, 90 Wash 2d 476, 585 P2d 71, 99 (1978).
2 Id at 121 (Rosellini dissenting).
2 The Washington court noted only that the funding system required some school
districts to reduce the amounts allocated to various general categories, without discussing
whether the education remained adequate. Id at 98.
28' Kukor v Grover, 148 Wis 2d 469, 436 NW2d 568, 579 (1989). Although I am endors-
ing the approach of the Kukor court, it is not possible to tell from the opinion whether
their conclusion of adequacy was in fact correct.
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an inadequate education. But the deficiencies relied on by some
courts are of doubtful importance to overall education for citi-
zenship. For example, the Tennessee Supreme Court invalidated
a funding scheme in part because it created disparities in "ad-
vanced foreign language courses, music and art courses, drama
and television courses,"282 and "extracurricular athletic
teams."us
I suggest that only gross deficiencies should be held to de-
prive children of an adequate education for three reasons. First,
as almost every court has recognized, the complexities of school
funding are much better suited to legislative than judicial resolu-
tionY Thus, courts should be loath to disturb legislative at-
tempts to balance all the factors that affect school funding
schemes, including school equity, local control, voter willingness
to support schools, and disincentives to engage in waste or mis-
management.
More importantly, only the very grossest deficiencies-for
example, the unsafe buildings and missing facilities found in
New Jersey-are likely to make a difference in outcome. As noted
earlier, virtually all of the researchers in this area conclude that
most financially remediable factors make little or no difference to
whether a school performs effectivelyY5 Thus, the standard ju-
dicial remedy-equalizing funding-probably will not provide a
better education to those in weak or inadequate schools unless
the inadequacy is patent and debilitating.
Finally, even if the wealthier districts do provide a "better"
education in some sense, a responsible republican approach sug-
gests limits to the egalitarianism behind some of the state court
rulings. A republican approach sees the purpose of education as
preparation for citizenship: as long as it is adequate to that task,
all children's education need not be equal. The republican empha-
sis on virtue and responsibility necessarily leads to a higher
tolerance for inequalities than is currently acceptable under an
individual rights model. Some parents who can afford better
Tennessee Small School Systems v McWherter, 851 SW2d 139, 144 (Tenn 1993). See
also Helena Elementary School District v State, 236 Mont 44, 769 P2d 684, 687-88 (1989)
(evidence of unconstitutional disparities included "richer and expanded curricula," espe-
cially in "specialty areas of physical education, music, and art"; no finding of inadequate
education at poorer schools).
McWherter, 851 SW2d at 146.
See generally Note, Education Finance Reform Litigation and Separation of Pow-
ers: Kentucky Makes Its Contribution, 80 Ky L J 309 (1990-91).
" See text accompanying notes 214-17.
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schools (whether by moving to wealthier districts or purchasing a
private education) may be unwilling to make the sacrifices to do
so, and some parents may be unable to do so in part because of
earlier unvirtuous choices regarding their own education or dili-
gence. Some children will take advantage of the educational
opportunities offered, however large or small, and some will not.
The approach I am advocating in this Article, with its endorse-
ment of a strong sense of individual (and familial) responsibility,
suggests that such differences are inevitable in a heterogeneous
society and should not be suppressed.286 Just as guaranteeing
that no one will starve does not guarantee that everyone will eat
caviar, guaranteeing an education adequate to citizenship does
not mean that some parents may not choose to purchase an even
better education for their children. The current obsession with
equality, moreover, often serves to distract attention from the
real problem: very few children today are receiving an education
adequate to citizenship, regardless of their family's financial
situation.
If the problem is not inequality but inadequacy, a problem
that the usual solution of increasing funding will not solve, how
can we guarantee an education for citizenship to our children,
especially those in the poorest districts? The answer turns on the
much neglected proposition that citizens have responsibilities as
well as rights. While it is the responsibility of the state to pro-
vide an adequate education, it is the responsibility of the individ-
ual student (or the student's parents) to take advantage of it. In
the next Section, I explore the ramifications for school financing
of the republican notion of individual responsibility.
2. Individual responsibility and individual choice.
Courts are invalidating schemes that fund schools out of
local property taxes, state legislatures are increasingly pressed
for funds, and doubts are rising about the effectiveness of the
current public school system. As a result, some states have begun
looking for alternative methods of financing effective schools.
Wisconsin has implemented a pilot program of parental choice,
subsidizing private school attendance for some low-income Mil-
waukee students."s7 A measure to permit education vouchers
See text accompanying note 31.
See Wis Stat § 119.23 (1991 & Supp 1993). For discussions of the Wisconsin plan,
see, for example, Note, Milwaukee Parental Choice Program Upheld, 75 Marq L Rev 673,
673-76 (1992); Comment, The Constitutional Implications of School Choice, 1992 Wis L
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(which would allow parents to use state money to send their
children to schools of their own choosing, including private
schools) was on the ballot in California in 1993, although it lost
by a large margin. As one commentator notes, "Choice proposals
for educating children have been around for centuries."' Al-
though the idea of using state-funded vouchers to subsidize pa-
rental choice is not new, it seems to be gaining favor. The best-
known modern proponents of choice are Milton Friedman, 9
John Coons and Stephen Sugarman,"0 and John Chubb and
Terry Moe.29' Their proposals vary in detail, but all agree that
the government should encourage market competition among
both public and private schools by subsidizing tuition costs for
private school attendance, thus increasing parental choice about
education.2
In the remainder of this Article, I will suggest that, despite
its potential shortcomings, a voucher (or choice) system is in ac-
cordance with the basic principles of responsible republican edu-
cation. I will also respond to the most common criticisms of a
voucher system. It is important to note at the outset, however,
that my arguments in favor of choice are quite different from the
usual liberal or libertarian justifications offered by most choice
proponents. Neither individual freedom nor economic efficiency is
a sufficient justification under a republican vision of education;
instead, we must examine whether voucher plans are superior to
the current system in terms of both educating children for re-
sponsible citizenship and reinvigorating the lost assumption of
individual responsibility in society.
Giving parents the financial means to choose where their
children will be educated promotes responsible republican citizen-
Rev 459, 469-71.
' James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 Yale L J 259, 277 (1991), reviewing John
E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools (Brookings, 1990)
(citing, inter alia, Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Paine, John Stuart Mill, and Adam Smith).
' Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in Robert A. Solo, ed,
Economics and the Public Interest 123 (Rutgers, 1955).
o John E. Coons and Stephen D. Sugarman, Education By Choice: The Case for
Family Control (California, 1978); John E. Coons and Stephen D. Sugarman, Family
Choice in Education: A Model State System for Vouchers, 59 Cal L Rev 321 (1971); John E.
Coons and Stephen D. Sugarman, The Scholarship Initiative: A Model State Law for
Elementary and Secondary School Choice, 21 J L & Educ 529 (1992).
1 John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools
(Brookings, 1990).
' I am using "choice" and "voucher" interchangeably, and I am intentionally omitting
the versions of "choice" that give parents a choice only among public schools. See, for
example, Minn Stat § 120.062 (1993 & Supp 1994).
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ship in several ways. First, of course, to the extent that it im-
proves education for at least some future citizens, it will further
the basic goals of an education for citizenship. Proponents of
choice argue generally that a market in educational services will
necessarily improve the quality of those services by increasing
competition among providers. We need not rely solely on specula-
tion, however: at least one study strongly suggests that private
schools are in fact more effective at educating their students than
are public schools, even when race, socioeconomic status, and
other family factors are held constant."3 Moreover, to the ex-
tent that the quality of education depends primarily on discipline
and teacher expectations, the public nature of public educa-
tion-including, for example, the power wielded by teachers' un-
ions,294 the protections accorded by civil servant status, the hier-
archical and bureaucratic organization of the schools,295 and the
process due before a student can be expelled 6 -might interfere
with attempts to improve the quality of education. Thus, it is at
least plausible to suggest that increased access to private
schools-coupled with regulation to ensure that voucher schools
as well as public schools teach the three aspects of education for
citizenship outlined earlier-would improve the quality of educa-
tion for those who formerly lacked such access. Whether that
improvement might come at too high a cost is a question I will
defer until my discussion of the pitfalls of voucher plans.297
The uniquely republican advantage to a choice system, how-
ever, is that it rewards and encourages individual responsibility.
Families who are forced into unresponsive public schools by eco-
nomic circumstances, and commentators who bemoan those
schools' dismal statistics, will inevitably tend to blame the
schools when students do not do well. Indeed, the students' fail-
ure may be due in part to poor schools which have little or no
incentive to improve and in part to the lack of choice itself. Re-
moving the compulsion removes the crutch that allows individu-
2 See Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore, High School Achievement at 178-79 (cited in
note 180).
See, for example, Lieberman, Public Education at 47-66 (cited in note 108).
See, for example, Sizer, Horace's Compromise at 206-09 (cited in note 194); Chubb
and Moe, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools at 18-20, 66-69 (cited in note 291).
On due process, see Goss v Lopez, 419 US 565, 577-84 (1975).
Another advantage to a system of choice is that it avoids all of the thorny problems
associated with school funding disparities. Once schools depend on student-borne funds
rather than on local property taxes, Rodriguez problems no longer arise: all school dis-
tricts compete equally for the same funds. If parents are judging the minimal adequacy of
schools, courts don't have to.
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als and families to claim this type of victim status. A well-de-
signed choice plan tells families that they are responsible for
their children's education, and that even the very poor will be re-
warded-with superior schooling and the subsequent economic
and social advantages it confers-if they act responsibly. Thus,
the very act of choosing an education is itself educational, in a
republican sense, for the parents and children involved.
There are, of course, a number of criticisms of a voucher
system. Two related criticisms are that such a system would
increase racial and economic segregation, " and that it would
benefit only the wealthy, leaving the poorest students in public
schools that deteriorate even further as those with greater choice
abandon them.29 ' Both existing research and common sense
suggest that these criticisms are unwarranted.
The only comprehensive study to evaluate the question of
segregation reaches exactly the opposite conclusion: that because
private schools are on average less segregated than public
schools, increasing the percentage of children (especially the per-
centage of poor and minority children) attending private schools
would most likely decrease racial and economic segregation.3° .
Since wealthy parents already have a choice of schools, it is rea-
sonable to expect that a voucher system will primarily increase
the power of the disproportionately minority poor who cannot
currently afford to opt out of the public schools.3 °' Indeed, one
critic of choice plans implicitly recognizes this when he suggests
that the best way to improve inner-city public schools is to elimi-
nate the exit options that wealthy parents currently have.0 2
' See, for example, Donald Fisher, Family Choice and Education: Privatizing a
Public Good, in Michael E. Manley-Casimir, ed, Family Choice in Schooling: Issues and
Dilemmas 199, 202-03 (Lexington, 1982); Richard M. Merelman, Knowledge, Educational
Organization, and Choice, in William H. Clune and John F. Witte, eds, 1 Choice and
Control in American Education: The Theory of Choice and Control in Education 79, 82-85
(Falmer, 1990); Liebman, 101 Yale L J at 284-86 (cited in note 288); Kaus, The End of
Equality at 156 (cited in note 105); Center for the Study of Public Policy, Education
Vouchers: A Report on Financing Elementary Education by Grants to Parents 6, 29 (1970).
"' See, for example, Liebman, 101 Yale L J at 293-98 (cited in note 288); Jomills
Henry Braddock, H, The Issue Is Still Equality of Educational Opportunity, 51 Harv Educ
Rev 490, 495 (1981); Center for the Study of Public Policy, Education Vouchers at 30-31.
' Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore, High School Achievement at 36-41, 68-70, 177, 182-
84 (cited in note 180).
" See, for example, Stephen Arons, Educational Choice as a Civil Rights Strategy, in
Neal E. Devins, ed, Public Values, Private Schools 63 (Falmer, 1989); John E. Coons, As
Arrows in the Hand, in William H. Clune and John F. Witte, eds, 1 Choice and Control in
American Education: The Theory of Choice and Control in Education 319, 320-22 (Falmer,
1990).
' Liebman, 101 Yale L J at 299-302, 308-14 (cited in note 288).
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Finally, at least some poor minority parents themselves believe
that choice represents an improvement over the current system:
the relief they sought in their equal protection suit for education-
al discrimination was city reimbursement for attendance at pri-
vate schools."'
Arguments that choice plans would restrict educational op-
portunities for the poor ultimately rest on a paternalistic view of
poor and minority parents. No one seems to deny that at least
some poor and minority students would be better off-those
whose parents actually used the vouchers in a way that improved
the education of their children. The problem, according to one
critic, is that a voucher system "assumes that all parents and
students are capable of making rational, positive choices.""' As
another critic notes, only "educational connoisseurs" are willing
to make the effort necessary to obtain a better education for their
children, and increasing their exit options necessarily diminishes
the quality of the schools they leave behind.0 5 The case against
choice thus rests on an acceptance and accommodation of individ-
ual irresponsibility: because some poor parents will not fulfill
their duties to their children responsibly, we should deny them
the choice that is already available to wealthier parents. A re-
sponsible republican approach exposes the fallacy of this strata-
gem at its roots. All parents should be expected to behave re-
sponsibly, and public policy should assume that they will do so.
Thus, a choice plan is better public policy because it, unlike oppo-
sition to choice, assumes that parents will behave responsibly.
But what of parents who in fact do not act responsibly? Any
proponent of choice must confront the problem that children
whose parents do not use their educational vouchers responsibly
may in fact be left in a worse position than they are in now, as
they and their schools are abandoned by classmates who possess
one of the most important advantages-parents who care about
education. It seems incontrovertible that "kids will learn more
math and speak clearer English if they're surrounded by kids
who care about learning math and who speak clear English.""°
' See Rivarde v Missouri, 930 F2d 641, 642 (8th Cir 1991) (denying the requested
relief). See also Deborah E. Beck, Jenkins v. Missouri: School Choice as a Method for
Desegregating an Inner-City School District, 81 Cal L Rev 1029, 1047-57 (1993).
Mary Jane Guy, The American Common Schools: An Institution At Risk, 21 J L &
Educ 569, 572 (1992).
Liebman, 101 Yale L J at 295-98 (cited in note 288).
Kaus, The End of Equality at 108-09 (cited in note 105). See also Liebman, 101
Yale L J at 293-95 (cited in note 288).
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How do we protect children whose parental irresponsibility de-
prives them of an education adequate to citizenship?
There are two possible solutions, depending on how firmly
committed we are to encouraging individual responsibility. First,
we can do what Mickey Kaus suggests in another context. Kaus
argues that all welfare ought to be terminated, but that every
single mother should be guaranteed a job and day care. What
happens to those who refuse?
The short answer is that nothing happens. There's no penal-
ty. Also no check. Perhaps she will discover some other, bet-
ter way of feeding herself and her family. If, on the other
hand, her children are subsequently discovered living in
squalor and filth, then she has neglected a basic task of par-
enthood. She is subject to the laws that already provide for
removal of a child from an unfit home.0 7
A parent who refuses to exercise her responsibility to provide her
children with an adequate education-when the state, through
vouchers, is offering her the means to do so-is similarly neglect-
ing a basic task of parenthood. And perhaps her children will be
better off with the state as surrogate parent. Those who view the
poor as incompetent to choose schools are already requiring the
state to exercise one important parental responsibility, so why
not concede defeat and let the state do the whole job?..8 More-
over, the implicit or explicit threat that their children might be
taken away (together with a careful system of warnings, hear-
ings, and other mechanisms designed to provide incentives for
change rather than immediate punishment) might induce more
parents to become concerned about their children's education.
If that approach still seems unduly harsh, Susan Rose-
Ackerman has offered a more sophisticated solution. She pro-
poses "proxy shopping," which "makes use of the market choices
of unsubsidized clients to ensure high quality for the needy."0 9
In other words, the state can purchase education for those whose
"' Kaus, The End of Equality at 126-27 (cited in note 105).
Indeed, a number of states already have child welfare statutes that include educa-
tional neglect within the definition of parental neglect. See, for example, Minn Stat §
260.015.2a(3) (1992 & Supp 1994); Mo Rev Stat § 210.110(5) (1983 & Supp 1994); NY
Family Ct Act § 1012(f)(i)(A) (McKinney 1994). See generally Eric W. Johnson, Education-
al Neglect as a Proper Harm to Warrant a Child Neglect Finding: In re B.B., 76 Iowa L
Rev 167 (1990).
' Susan Rose-Ackerman, Rethinking the Progressive Agenda: The Reform of the
American Regulatory State 97-98 (Free Press, 1992). See generally id at 97-117.
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parents are unable or unwilling to make the choices themselves,
based on the choices of those motivated to do so. Rose-Ackerman
herself does not believe that proxy shopping will work in the
educational setting,1 ° but her reasons for this negative assess-
ment are not persuasive as to all choice plans. She suggests that
proxy shopping will not work in education for two reasons: there
are no "paying customers," and high-income parents in fact prefer
to segregate their children from poor children. This ensures that
every time the state uses high-income parents as proxies to place
poor children in the same schools, those parents will exit the
schools. 1'
The solution to these problems is provided by Rose-
Ackerman herself: if all schools are required to "accept a share of
the needy," or the wealthy are compensated for giving up their
prejudices, an educational voucher system has more poten-
tial.312 And indeed, some choice proposals contain various provi-
sions designed both to attract the wealthy and to entice or com-
pel schools to take the least desirable students. 13 Moreover,
those who argue that the wealthy will be the only ones who bene-
fit from a voucher plan must believe that the benefit is some
compensation of the sort to which Rose-Ackerman alludes. While
designing a specific plan that takes account of Rose-Ackerman's
difficulties may not be easy, neither should it be impossible. It is
also possible that proxy shopping might be unnecessary: consum-
er and producer behavior in other market contexts suggests that
in order to compete, all schools would adopt the improvements
desired by the most concerned parents, thus benefitting the chil-
dren of unconcerned parents as well. 14
One final criticism of choice plans is worthy of note. Several
commentators have suggested that using vouchers would inter-
fere with the transmission of a common culture by "encouraging
separation and stratification of students according to parental
310 Id at 114-16.
... Id at 115. Although this does not affect the validity of her criticism, I believe she is
mistaken about the motivations of high-income parents. It is not poor children per se they
seek to avoid, but the children of parents who do not care enough about education. See
Kaus, The End of Equality at 108-20 (cited in note 105). Nevertheless, since I am sug-
gesting proxy shopping as a solution to the irresponsibility of those parents, it is likely
that high-income parents will similarly seek to avoid schools in which the state places the
children of the irresponsible.
" Rose-Ackerman, Rethinking the Progressive Agenda at 115 (cited in note 309).
' See, for example, Coons and Sugarman, 21 J L & Educ at 533-36 (cited in note
290).
"' See Lieberman, Public Education at 94-113 (cited in note 108).
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commitments and orientations and by tailoring curricula to ap-
peal to and reinforce these parental concerns."315 Since this goes
to the heart of a republican education, such a criticism, if valid,
would seriously undermine my claim that responsible republican-
ism is compatible with a voucher plan. There are two reasons
why the criticism is wrong. First; of course, some parents already
have such a choice, and few would wish to deprive them of it.
The "cultural transmission" critics must either concede that pri-
vate schools are also transmitting a common culture (and per-
haps doing so more effectively 1 ), or be willing to abandon the
children of the wealthy to educational failure. More importantly,
adoption of a voucher system need not entail abandonment of
state involvement in the curriculum. While some proposals would
prohibit the state from regulating private schools that take
vouchers,1 7 a republican voucher plan necessarily incorporates
the educational basics laid out in Part II. Thus, although private
schools would remain private in many ways,"8 the state could
still ensure that their curricula are adequate to produce responsi-
ble republican citizens. Indeed, this would be an improvement
over the current system, under which neither public nor private
schools are required to meet this standard.
Amy Gutmann has suggested a more sophisticated criticism
of vouchers from a republican perspective. She argues that regu-
lating voucher schools has two flaws. If the regulation is mini-
mal, "[v]oucher plans attempt to avoid rather than settle our
"' Henry M. Levin, Educational Vouchers and Social Policy 16 (Institute for Research
on Educational Finance and Governance, 1979). For criticism along the same lines, see
Guy, 21 J L & Educ at 578-81 (cited in note 304); Amy Gutmann, Democratic Schools and
Moral Education, 1 Notre Dame J L Ethics & Policy 461, 476-80 (1985).
... See Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore, High School Achievement at 144 (cited in note
180).
317 See, for example, Arons, Compelling Belief at 213 (cited in note 179).
'x' The two most troubling issues, which are beyond the scope of this Article, are
religion and racial discrimination. It seems clear that the government could continue to
prohibit private schools from discriminating, whether or not the schools accept vouchers.
And as to religious schools, while the wisdom of state subsidies to parochial schools may
be questionable, after Lee v Weisman, 112 S Ct 2649, 2660-61 (1992), and Zobrest v
Catalina Foothills School District, 113 S Ct 2462, 2469 (1993), the constitutionality is not.
See Suzanna Sherry, Lee v Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 S Ct Rev 123, 131-33. See
generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 Case W Res L Rev 795, 843-61
(1993). See also Mueller v Allen, 463 US 388, 401-04 (1983). The finer points of regulation,
including student discipline, teacher protections, whether schools could charge more than
the voucher amount, and so on, are details that must await a more appropriate article.
Other issues will also arise, such as questions about how to accommodate students with
disabilities. See Mei-lan E. Wong, The Implications of School Choice for Children With
Disabilities, 103 Yale L J 827 (1993).
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disagreements over how to develop democratic character through
schooling."319 On the other hand, if the regulation is pervasive,
it erroneously assumes a "single self-evident set of regulations"
as opposed to a variety of ways to inculcate democratic charac-
ter.32 Thus, no voucher plan can successfully incorporate the
notion of education for citizenship.
My proposal is somewhere between minimal and pervasive
regulation: it is pervasive as to what, generally, must be taught,
but minimal as to how it is to be taught and how the schools are
to be run. Thus, as to curriculum, I have tried to specify a gen-
eral set of "regulations" which, while not self-evident, I have tried
to justify persuasively. Nevertheless, the particulars that
Gutmann mentions as useful variations-including civics courses,
democratically run schools, graduation or promotion require-
ments, and busing-are still options under my proposal. The
difference between a voucher plan and the current scheme, then,
is that parents are permitted to diverge rather than being forced
to submit to the majority's view on these particulars. In short, I
disagree with Gutmann over whether "avoid[ance]" or "set-
tle[ment]" is the best solution to the problem of disagreements
over education. It is unlikely that all parents will ever agree on
educational strategy, so we should allow all parents the choices
that a few parents have under the current system. In addition,
forcing parents to settle their differences is likely to lead to con-
troversy over details and side issues and, consequently, to dilute
the commitment to-and the effectiveness of-the basic education
for citizenship outlined in this Article.
Funding schools through a voucher plan, with state enforce-
ment of republican educational policy, is thus consistent with re-
sponsible republicanism. Moreover, a voucher system has an
additional advantage under a republican approach in that it
rewards individual responsibility and avoids holding the
state-and productive citizens-responsible for individual failures
of will.
CONCLUSION
Our schools are failing, and the basic tenets of liberal indi-
vidualism are under attack. I have tried to suggest that the two
phenomena may be related, both in their causes and in their
319 Gutmann, Democratic Education at 68 (cited in note 112).
"o Id at 69.
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remedies. Because we have lost our own virtue, we are corrupt-
ing the next generation. That is neither just nor inevitable. An
emphasis on individual responsibility, especially as played out in
the educational context, may reclaim our republican heritage and
rescue liberalism from its own excesses.
